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ABSTRACT 
 
 
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS (1945-1980): SEARCH FOR SECURITY 
AND ADAPTING TO CHANGE 
 
Pakel, Aykın Berk 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
January 2007 
 
 
This thesis aims to elaborate on Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 
1980. It attempts to give an account of the major developments and trends in the 
relations between the two countries in the selected timeframe. It purports to find out 
the domestic and international economic, political and military factors and 
developments that were instrumental in the constitution of a close partnership between 
the two countries and in the alienation and partial disengagement that were observed 
in the relationship as of the mid-1960s. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
1945-1980 YILLARI ARASINDA TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ: 
GÜVENLİK ARAYIŞI VE DEĞİŞİME ADAPTASYON 
 
Pakel, Aykın Berk 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
Ocak 2007 
 
 
 
 
 Bu tez 1945 ve 1980 yılları arasında Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini irdelemeyi 
amaçlayıp, zikredilen zaman diliminde iki ülke ilişkilerinde vuku bulan önemli olay 
ve olgulara dikkat çekmektedir. Çalışma, iki ülke arasında yakın bir işbirliği teşkil 
edilmesinde ve 1960’ların ortalarından itibaren ilişkilerde gözlemlenen kısmi 
yabancılaşmaya sebep olan iç ve dış, ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri etmen ve gelişmeleri 
betimlemektedir. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İttifak, Kıbrıs, Soğuk Savaş, 
İlişkilerde Gözlemlenen Değişimler 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 The history of Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1980 
witnessed several changes. The relationship was in essence, close and cordial in 
the late 1940s, the 1950s and the early 1960s. During this era, the problems and 
disagreements that appeared in the relationship were subordinated to the need to 
cooperate within the context of the main goal of containing Soviet expansionism.  
This era of basically harmonious relations came to an end as the thaw in the Cold 
War, the receding of the Soviet threat and the relative decrease in the importance 
that the parties attached to the alliance; domestic developments in both countries 
and last but not least, the Cyprus conflicts of 1964 and 1974 and the following 
Johnson letter and the imposition of an American arms embargo on Turkey, 
altered the relationship. The two countries came to terms with the fact that the 
almost complete confluence of Turkish and Americans goals and policies were no 
longer and the degree of economic, military and diplomatic cooperation between 
the two countries decreased. Yet, in the words of American scholar George S. 
Harris, the alliance relationship ‘‘remained one of impressive intimacy, even if 
punctuated by friction over subsidiary issues and characterized by public 
mistrust’’.1  
                                                          
1 George S. Harris, Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine, p.66.  
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 In order to place the changes in the nature of the Turkish-American 
relations into a reasonable context, the history of the two countries’ relations 
between 1945 and 1980 needs to be analyzed. This study attempts to achieve that 
objective and tries to examine the major developments and trends in the relations 
between the two countries in the selected timeframe. Moreover, the study attempts 
to find out the domestic and international; economic, political and military factors 
and developments that were instrumental in the constitution of a close alliance 
partnership and in the changes and relative alienation that were observed in the 
relationship as of the mid-1960s.  
 The study has a descriptive method in that it tries to give an insight 
regarding the history of the relationship between the two countries. It presents a 
portrait of how relations between the two countries took shape. It also makes a 
comparative analysis and examines the behavior, views and motives of both sides 
concerning a certain development and does not solely reflect one side’s 
perspective. Moreover, the international system, the states and the individuals are 
jointly considered during the analysis of events and trends. 
 In this context, Chapter II will study the factors and developments that 
were instrumental in the desire on the part of both countries to constitute an 
alliance relationship. This will be followed by a discussion on the substance of the 
military, diplomatic and economic relationships during the 1950s. The chapter will 
be concluded by a discussion of the aftermath of the 1960 coup in Turkey and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and its effects upon the relationship. Chapter III will study 
the 1964 Cyprus crisis, the following Johnson letter and the factors and 
developments that played a part in the alienation and increasing disagreements 
observed in the relations between the two countries as of 1964. This will be 
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followed by a discussion concerning the ramifications of the Johnson letter on the 
relations and on Turkish foreign policy. Specific issues such as the rise of anti-
Americanism in Turkey as of 1964, problems of aid, the bilateral agreements, the 
1967 Cyprus crisis and the opium controversy will also be examined in detail. 
Chapter IV will start with the analysis of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the subsequent 
imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey by the U.S. Congress and the major 
factors and motives involved in the embargo decision. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the effects of the embargo on the relationship and on Turkish foreign 
policy as well as the diplomatic developments that took place during the three-and-
a-half years during which the embargo was in effect. The chapter will be 
concluded by an overview of the developments following the repeal of the 
embargo legislation and the factors and developments involved in the decision on 
the part of both countries to constitute a closer alliance partnership as of the late 
1970s. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
COLD WAR PARTNERS: 1945-1964 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Search for Security 
During the Second World War, Turkey concluded that the Soviet Union 
was going to demand a revision of the Montreux Convention, which regulated 
passage through the Turkish Straits (Straits, hereafter), ‘‘in the Soviet Union's 
favor, and possibly other concessions’’ after the war had ended ‘‘without knowing 
the exact nature of the demands.’’2 In March 1945, the Soviet government 
officially denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression of 1925 with 
Turkey, citing that ‘‘this treaty was no longer in accord with the ‘new situation’ 
and needed serious improvement.’’3 Three months later, in June 1945, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov told Selim Sarper, the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, 
that as a price for renewing the treaty, the Soviet Union wanted a new Straits 
Convention, that would be negotiated only between Turkey and the Soviet Union, 
which would provide for the free passage of Soviet warships through the Straits 
and their closure to non-Black Sea states, the lease to the Soviet Union of naval 
bases at the Straits, and the retrocession to the U.S.S.R. of  Kars and Ardahan. 
Sarper's reply was that ‘‘Turkey could not consider Soviet bases at the Straits, or 
the retrocession of the two provinces,’’ while ‘‘any revision of the Montreux 
                                                          
2 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 111. 
3 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 34. 
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Convention would have to be a matter for international negotiation and 
agreement.’’4 ‘‘These Soviet demands and the manner of their presentation’’ 
terrified Turkey. They ‘‘left no doubt in the Turks’ mind that the Soviet aim was 
not only the control of the Straits, but also submission of Turkey to satellite 
status’’5 and ‘‘pointed up to the necessity of improving ties with the West.’’6 
Moreover, ‘‘tension was heightened by the presence of at least twenty-five Red 
Army divisions near the Turkish border whose maneuvers on Turkish frontiers 
posed a definite threat.’’7 ‘‘Turkey was made even more apprehensive by the 
renewed civil war in Greece between the government forces and the communist 
insurgents and the establishment of Soviet puppet governments in Iranian 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.8 At that stage, Turkey was not in a position to maintain 
its army mobilized against the Soviet Union for a very long time. Furthermore, 
Britain no longer had the power or the resources to support Turkey against the 
Soviet Union. Hence, the Turks had to try to ‘‘involve the United States in 
defending Turkey against the Soviet Union and bring the American position on the 
Straits into harmony with the Turkish view’’,9 for the U.S. seemed as the only 
country powerful enough to counter the Soviet threat. ‘‘To this end, the İnönü 
government stepped up its consultations with the United States, attempting to 
dramatize the Soviet threat, arguing that the Kremlin would be deterred not by  
 
                                                          
4 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 111. 
5 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus, p. 173. 
6 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 
1945-1971, (Washington D.C.: AEI Hoover Policy Study 2, 1972), p.16. 
7 Nur Bilge Criss, ‘‘U.S. Forces in Turkey,’’ p.331. In Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang 
Krieger, eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years: 1945-1970, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1993), pp.331-350. 
8 Nur Bilge Criss, U.S. Forces in Turkey, p.338. 
9 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 
1945-1971, pp. 17-18. 
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concessions, but by firmness.’’ It also argued that Turkey’s geo-strategic location 
vis-à-vis the Middle East made it a country very important for the West.10  
However, when informed about the Soviet demands, the U.S. State 
Department deployed a detached attitude saying that ‘‘the United States 
considered Turkey an area of conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Britain.’’11 ‘‘At 
that stage, the Americans were very reluctant to take on distant commitments, such 
as ensuring the security of the Turkish Straits’’12 and still believed that the 
wartime partnership with the Soviet Union could be continued after the war. 
Therefore, the United States tried to calm down Turkey and did not criticize 
Moscow regarding the Soviet demands over Turkey and did not oppose Stalin on 
this issue during the first post-war meeting of the United States, Britain and the 
Soviet Union at Potsdam in July-August 1945. At the end of the Potsdam 
Conference, the ‘‘Big Three’’ agreed to work out the Straits problem with Turkey 
in bilateral negotiations to produce a new regime, while ‘‘Ankara had not been 
sanguine about seeing e its intimate concerns debated in its absence.’’13 
In November 1945, the U.S. presented its views concerning the regime of 
the Straits, which foresaw freedom of passage for warships of the Black Sea states, 
and limited rights for the warships of non-Black Sea states-‘‘a position similar to 
that of the Soviets and one which somewhat alarmed the Turkish government.’’14 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union kept heavy diplomatic pressure on Turkey regarding 
                                                          
10 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective:  
1945-1971, p.18. 
11 Süha Bölükbaşı, ‘‘The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations Between 
1917-1960,’’ Foreign Policy Vol. 16, Nos: 1-2, p.87. 
12 Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Turkey—Anglo-American Security Interests: 1945-1952: The First 
Enlargement of NATO, (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 43 quoted in William Hale, Turkish 
Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, p.112. 
13 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 
1945-1971, p.17. 
14 Harry N. Howard, ‘‘The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations,’’ The Middle East 
Journal,Vol. 30, No.3, (1976), p. 306. 
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the Straits issue during late 1945 and 1946. The Soviet position regarding the 
Straits issue was formally presented on August 7, 1946, repeating its views in 
1945. Turkey refused the Soviet note.  
On August 15, 1946, President Truman told the Turks that ‘‘the U.S. would 
support them in opposing the Soviet demands’’ and the Turkish government was 
‘‘advised on August 16 to assume a reasonable, but firm, attitude.’’ Truman held 
that the ‘‘American position of firm support’’ to Turkey ‘‘had been formulated 
only after full consideration had been given to the matter at the highest levels.’’15 
On August 19, 1946, the U.S. reply to the Soviet note of August 7, noted that ‘‘a 
regime of the Straits was not the exclusive affair of the Black Sea powers’’ and 
warned:  
        Should the Straits become the object of an attack, or the threat of an  
        attack, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international 
        security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the UN  
        Security Council.16 
  
By that time, the U.S., as a result of Soviet actions in Germany, Eastern Europe 
and Iran, had started to become suspicious of the U.S.S.R.’s expansionist policy. It 
had realized that the post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union could not be 
continued and that the world was being divided into communist and anti-
communist spheres. Accordingly, it had to forego its traditionally isolationist 
foreign policy and adopt a global foreign policy by leading the Western world and 
by embarking on a policy of containing Soviet expansionism through the creation 
of a cordon sanitaire around the U.S.S.R.17 Truman wrote: 
           
                                                          
15 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton, 
1969), pp. 194-196. 
16 Harry N. Howard, ‘‘The Turkish Straits after World War II: Problems and Prospects,’’ Balkan 
Studies Vol. 11, No: 1, (1970), p. 46. 
17 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 446-472. 
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        I had a very good picture of what a revival of American isolationism 
        would mean for the world. After World War II it was clear that  
        without American participation, there was no power capable of meeting  
        Russia as an equal. Inaction, withdrawal, ‘‘Fortress America’’ notions  
        could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now 
        denied to them. This was the time to align the U.S. clearly on the side of  
        the free world.18 
 
Hence, the United States decided to strengthen Europe militarily (in a 
defense system against the U.S.S.R.) and economically under its leadership. 
Parallel to these developments, Washington had realized by then that, ‘‘taken in 
conjuncture with Soviet actions elsewhere and in the light of the unsuccessful 
conference of foreign ministers in December 1945,’’ ‘‘the Soviets clearly wanted 
to take control of’’ not only ‘‘Turkey’’ and the Straits,19 but also the Middle East. 
The U.S. displayed its concern for Turkey's security by ‘‘privately assuring 
Ankara that it would not permit Turkish sovereignty to be violated’’20 and by 
dispatching the battleship Missouri to İstanbul21 on April 5, 1946.  ‘‘The Turkish 
press hailed’’ the dispatch of the Missouri by calling ‘‘the United States, the 
defender of peace, right, justice, progress, and prosperity.’’22 ‘‘This ‘show of 
force’ was a warning which could not have escaped the attention of Moscow’’23 
and was generally accepted as ‘‘marking the end of Turkey's post-war diplomatic  
 
                                                          
18 John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy, (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1958), p.33. 
19 Mustafa Aydın, Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures 
during the Cold War, p.107. 
20 George S. Harris, ‘‘Cross-alliance Politics: Turkey and the Soviet Union,’’ Milletlerarası 
Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı (The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations), Vol. 12, (1972), pp. 
10-11. 
21 The Battleship Missouri was carrying the remains of the deceased Turkish Ambassador to 
Washington, Mr. Münir Ertegün, who had passed away two years ago. 
22 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 
1945-1971, p. 20. 
23 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus, p. 173. 
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isolation’’.24 ‘‘However, it was still unclear what concrete form’’ that American 
support for Turkey against the Soviet Union ‘‘would take.’’25  
On 24 September 1946, the Soviets proposed bilateral negotiations 
regarding the Straits issue to Turkey, but were refused by both the United States 
and Turkey. ‘‘In the event, this turned out to be the end of official diplomatic 
exchanges on the issue, but neither the Turks nor the Western powers could have 
known this at the time. Hence, Turkey still had to find effective means of securing 
its defense.’’26  
Meanwhile, Britain was in dire economic straits and in February 1947, it 
announced that it would no longer be able to support Turkey and Greece 
economically or militarily. ‘‘By this stage, U.S. leaders had been convinced that 
the defense of Greece and Turkey was essential for the protection of Western 
interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.’’27 The result was the 
‘‘Truman Doctrine’’ whereby President Truman, on 12 March 1947, asked from 
Congress approval of a $400 million military and economic aid program to Greece 
and Turkey (of which, $100 million was assigned to Turkey). The Congress 
accepted Truman’s proposal.  
The launch of the Truman Doctrine was an important turning point not 
only in Cold War history, but also in Turkey's quest for security in the face of 
Soviet threats to its independence and territorial integrity and in its relations with 
the United States. ‘‘It signified the formal emergence of the U.S. as Turkey’s chief 
                                                          
24 Mensur Akgün, ‘‘Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye ile Rusya Arasında Görünmez Bağlar: Boğazlar 
(Invisible Ties between Turkey and Russia from the Past to the Present),’’ p.74. In Gülten Kazgan 
and N. Ulçenko, eds., Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya (Turkey and Russia from the Past to the  
Present). (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 45-83. 
25 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy:1774-2000, p.114. 
26 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000), p. 115. 
27 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000), p. 115. 
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support in the West.’’28 ‘‘Turkey's inclusion in Truman's program was a clear 
signal to the U.S.S.R. that the U.S. was prepared to make a material rather than a 
purely symbolic contribution to the defense of Turkey.’’29 As Turkish Foreign 
Minister Necmeddin Sadak (1949: 461) explained: ‘‘The Truman Doctrine was a 
great comfort to the Turkish people, for it made them feel that they were no longer 
isolated.’’30 During 1948, Turkey also began to receive Marshall Plan aid. 
‘‘Between 1948 and 1952, Turkey would receive a total of $792.7 million in 
general aid and $687 million in military aid from the United States.’’31 Moreover, 
the United States and Turkey signed a military assistance agreement i.e. the Aid to 
Turkey Agreement of 194732 as a result of which, weaponry and other military 
equipment were supplied by Washington. Furthermore, ‘‘programs of road and 
harbor construction and the establishment of strategic installations’’ were 
embarked on with the ‘‘financial aid offered by the United States’’.33  
The Truman Doctrine was not, however, a permanent U.S. commitment to 
Turkey's defense. Thus, the Turks still needed to commit the Americans to 
protecting Turkey permanently. Meanwhile, ‘‘with the Berlin blockade’’ and the 
forceful establishment by the Soviets of communist regimes favorable to Moscow 
in Central and Eastern Europe, ‘‘the Cold War assumed definite shape in Europe, 
                                                          
28 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 
1945-1971, p. 25. 
29 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, p. 115. 
30 Necmeddin Sadak, ‘‘Turkey Faces the Soviets,’’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27,  (1949), p.461 quoted 
in William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, p. 115. 
31 Nur Bilge Criss, U.S. Forces in Turkey, p.341.  
32 This agreement stipulated the conditions under which Turkey would receive aid under the 
Truman Doctrine. For the full Turkish text of the agreement, see Fahir Armaoğlu’s Belgelerle 
Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Turkish-American Relations: A Documentary Record), (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 162-164. For the full English text, refer to George S. 
Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971, pp. 
213-215. 
33 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus, pp. 125-126. 
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and its institutional structures began to emerge,’’34 while the United States had 
become determined to establish a security organization for the defense of western 
Europe. Subsequently, in November 1948, Turkey filed an application for its 
inclusion in such an organization. The U.S. and Western Europeans were, 
however, not very enthusiastic about Turkish membership because at that point 
they ‘‘could not afford to spread meager resources thinly by extending the lines of 
defense’’ over too wide an area.35 Therefore the Turkish application was not 
successful and the Turks were worried about this development since ‘‘Turkey’s 
exclusion’’ from the prospective defense organization could lead to a decrease of 
American interest in Turkey’s security and ‘‘might send a signal to Stalin that the 
Western powers were not prepared to protect Turkey.’’36  
 ‘‘The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4, 1949, formalized the new 
alliance, but disappointed Turkey, mainly because Italy had been included, but 
Turkey and Greece left out.’’37 Membership to NATO was seen by Turkey as the 
only way of ensuring a permanent security guarantee. Turkish membership of 
NATO was to be held up for three years by complex obstacles. According to Hale 
(2000: 117):  
        the most important of these was that the Truman administration initially 
        tended to see Turkey as part of the Middle East rather than Europe, 
        and assumed that U.S. interests in the region were minimal compared 
        with those of Britain and given budgetary constraints between 1948 and 
        1950, the U.S. army still preferred to concentrate its resources on 
        western Europe. The British, meanwhile, were primarily concerned with  
        trying to prop up their decreasing power in the Middle East, and believed 
        that, rather than joining NATO, Turkey should take part in a 
        British-led Middle-Eastern defense system.  Turkey was willing to  
         
 
                                                          
34 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, p. 116. 
35 Nur Bilge Criss, U.S. Forces in Turkey, p.331. 
36 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, p. 116. 
37 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, p. 117. 
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        consider such an arrangement, but only on condition that admission to  
        NATO was part of the deal.38  
 
The global situation was then fundamentally changed by the Korean War 
in June 1950. Consequently, the U.S. defense budget was sharply increased. ‘‘This 
relieved the Truman administration of the need to define Turkey's strategic 
location. The funds were now there to incorporate Turkey (and Greece) into 
NATO.’’39  
The Korean War also gave Turkey a very good opportunity to display its 
solidarity with the West. A month after the start of the war, the Democrat Party 
(DP) government, elected in the first free elections in 1950 and led by Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes, sent a 4,500-men military unit to join the UN forces, in 
order to display its commitment to the Western world, ‘‘eradicate its image as an 
unreliable ally because Turkey had declared non-belligerency in World War II 
despite its treaty alliance of 1939 with Britain and France’’,40 and hence facilitate 
Turkish entry into NATO. ‘‘The Turkish brigade performed well during the war 
and earned high praise.’’41 A week after the decision to send Turkish troops to 
Korea, Turkey filed another application to join the Atlantic alliance. The 
Americans, however, were still reluctant to extend full membership to Turkey (and 
Greece). Shortly afterwards however, an important change in U.S. military 
strategy took place. Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe (SACEUR):  
        saw Europe shaped like a bottleneck, with the Soviet Union representing 
        the wide part. If the Soviet Union tried to move forward into the central  
         
                                                          
38 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, p. 117. 
39 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, p. 117. 
40 Nur Bilge Criss,  Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999, (Unpublished paper, Bilkent 
University, Ankara, Turkey, 2000), p.4. 
41 Nasuh Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a 
Distinctive Alliance, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), p. 69. 
 13
        bottleneck, then the West should attempt to hold it there, but also 
        hit the wide part of the bottle hard from both flanks, using air power. 
  
He believed that ‘‘Turkey was essential to this strategy, as the main anti-Soviet 
country on the southern flank.’’ But Turkey could not be expected to do act 
accordingly ‘‘unless it was given a firm security commitment by the Western 
powers’’, that is, its inclusion as a full member in NATO.42 Furthermore, the 
Americans had now realized that a Soviet attack on Turkey would have important 
repercussions for the security of the West due to the geo-strategic position of 
Turkey. 
The Truman Administration was convinced by these arguments and in May 
1951, it decided to press for the admission of Turkey (and Greece) as full members 
of NATO. ‘‘This left Turkey with the duty of convincing the other NATO allies.  
Britain wanted to make Turkish admission to NATO conditional on the Turks' 
agreement to co-sponsor the plan for a Middle East Defense Organization 
(MEDO).’’43 The Turks agreed to this British pre-condition and hence, Turkey 
(and Greece) officially became a member of NATO in February 1952. ‘‘Turkey's 
diplomatic and military isolation since 1878 and all the ramifications such 
isolation predicated upon the Ottoman Empire as well as the early Republic had 
come to an end.’’44  
To sum up the main reasons why the United States wanted to constitute an 
alliance relationship with Turkey and pressed for Turkish membership of NATO, 
it can be said that45 first, ‘‘for the U.S., Turkey was an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ 
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which could be used to stage attacks on the vital Soviet industrial centers and oil 
fields should war erupt.’’46 Second, the Soviet explosion of its first atomic bomb 
in 1949 marked an important turning point in U.S. foreign policy by increasing the 
threat to the security of the Western world. ‘‘This Soviet achievement forced the 
U.S. to take more effective security measures.’’47 Third, in 1950, a treaty of 
alliance was signed between the U.S.S.R. and China, which gave the impression to 
the U.S. that these two giant communist powers had formed a monolithic alliance 
against the West. ‘‘Against such a common front, the U.S. wanted to extend the 
policy of containment initiated by the Truman Doctrine.’’ Fourth, the Korean War 
was seen by the United States as the ‘‘first sign of the global military campaign 
launched by the U.S.S.R. for world domination and falsified the American belief 
that, due to American nuclear superiority, the Soviet Union would not dare to 
cause regional wars.’’48 Fifth, Turkey's important geo-political location vis-à-vis 
the strategic Middle East was an important factor in the American decision. And 
sixth, Turkish membership to NATO would force the Soviet Union to divert a 
significant number of forces from eastern and central Europe to its southern 
border. 
 On the Turks’ part, the search for security in the face of the Soviet threats 
to their independence and territorial integrity, the desire to become a full and equal 
member of the Western world and to be recognized by the West as such and  the 
need to receive military and economic assistance from the West in order to 
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strengthen its armed forces and hence increase its deterrence capability and to 
finance its economic development, impelled it to become a member of the Western 
security system and to constitute a close alliance relationship with the United 
States. Moreover, the transformation of the multi-polar nature of global politics 
into one characterized by bi-polarity forced Turkey to ally itself with the West. 
Further, World War II had ended with the victory of the Western democracies. 
Parallel to this development, Turkey was making the transition to multi-party 
politics.49 This had an effect on Turkish foreign policy as the ‘‘leaders of the DP 
genuinely believed that Turkey’s entrance to NATO was necessary for the future 
of the democratic system in Turkey and their own existence.’’50 
According to Coufoudakis (1981: 180), in order to attain the above-
mentioned goals: 
        Turkey had to gain the Americans’ commitment to both the security 
        and the economic and social modernization of the country. The latter was 
        to be achieved through the commitment of public and private funds from 
        the United States. Attaining the former goal required Turkey’s 
        military alignment with the U.S. and the American-inspired and 
        sponsored alliances in Europe and the Middle East. Turkey’s leadership 
        would utilize a variety of tactics, but primarily relied on their country’s 
        most important asset, its strategic location. …In the steadily escalating 
        Soviet-American confrontation of the late 1940s and the threat  
        posed to Turkey by the Soviets, Turkey did not have to try very hard 
        to gain America’s commitment.51   
 
2.2. The Menderes decade (1950-1960) in Turkish-American relations 
As stated earlier, NATO membership in 1952 had ended Turkey's 
diplomatic and military isolation. For Turkey, NATO membership not only 
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provided security against the Soviet Union, but also, it meant that Turkey would 
continue to receive the economic aid that it desperately needed for its economic 
development. Hence, ‘‘Turkish policy makers enthusiastically embraced a 
discourse of being NATO's ‘staunch’ ally and a ‘bulwark’ against communism.’’52 
During this era, ‘‘literally everything other than Turkey’s core objectives of 
maintaining security, political independence and territorial integrity were 
subordinated’’53 to the goal of constituting a close alliance relationship with the 
United States. Moreover, as a result of its dependency on the United States, 
Turkey tried to coordinate its policies with those of the West, particularly the 
United States.  
During the 1950s and early 1960s, that is, in the bi-polar ‘‘all white’’ or 
‘‘all black’’ atmosphere and high political and military tension of the early Cold 
War era, ‘‘Turkey's commitment to and engagement with the Western alliance in 
general and the United States in particular were at their height.’’54 In this era, 
NATO membership and alliance with the U.S. were appreciated by an 
overwhelming majority of the people in Turkey, while in the United States, the 
Congress supported the successive Administrations’ policy of constituting a close 
alliance relationship with Turkey. In essence, Turkish-American relations 
appeared to be harmonious and Turkish policy makers worked to ‘‘capitalize on 
the mutuality of strategic and political objectives with the Americans’’55 and thus 
involve the United States as much as possible in Turkey’s economy and defense. 
‘‘Obviously the Turkish leadership believed that Turkey stood to benefit from a 
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comprehensive association than from a bare formal security guarantee. To bring 
the somewhat refractory United States to this conclusion, the Turks were willing to 
take on a wide range of obligations.’’56  
During this era of basically harmonious relations (1952-early 1960s), 
Turkey and the United States approached their relations on the assumption of the 
confluence of the military and political interests and objectives of the two 
countries. The problems that appeared in the relationship were eventually solved 
within the context of the main mutual goal of containing communism. The 
perception of the congruence of national interests and Turkish foreign policy 
makers' confidence in the United States also prevented Turkey from putting 
restrictions on American military activity on its soil or ‘‘looking for ulterior 
motives behind American actions affecting Turkey’’. ‘‘Events such as American 
use of the İncirlik base during the 1958 Lebanon crisis’’ in an out-of-area 
operation without prior consultation with Turkish authorities, ‘‘the U-2 incident in 
1960’’ or the economic aid controversy in mid-1950s, ‘‘were considered by the 
Turks as too trivial and insignificant to harm the alliance.’’57 
On the Americans’ part, as indicated above, Turkey's geo-strategic location 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Middle East had made it a very important part 
of NATO. ‘‘In defending Turkey, the U.S. was acting as a nation whose global 
interests would seriously be endangered if Turkey faltered militarily or 
economically.’’58 Consequently, ‘‘assuring the best possible defense of Turkey 
required joint arrangements’’ i.e. bilateral agreements, ‘‘joint installations’’ to be 
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set up in Turkey and economic and military assistance to be provided to Turkey. 
Hence, a ‘‘special relationship’’ evolved.59 The United States, too, approached 
relations with the assumption that, Turkish-American national interests and 
policies were congruent. Therefore, in the words of American observer George S. 
Harris (1972: 45), ‘‘Americans thereafter tended to overestimate U.S. freedom of 
action in Turkey; they did not foresee the difficulties that would eventually arise 
from using the alliance for purposes that were not directly connected with 
containing the Soviet Union.’’60 
 
2.2.1. Military alliance 
 As a consequence of accession to NATO, the Turkish armed forces 
integrated with NATO defense structures and the American military presence in 
Turkey developed very rapidly during the 1950s. Accordingly, ‘‘three-quarters of 
Turkey's land forces were reserved for NATO purposes under the Commander-in-
Chief of Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), while the air force and 
navy were assigned to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
(SACEUR)’’.61 According to NATO strategy, the presence of Turkish military 
forces near the Soviet border would cause the Soviet Union to move a significant 
amount of its forces stationed in its western border to defend its Turkish border, 
thereby reducing the number of Soviet forces that could be available to attack 
western Europe. Under bilateral and secret agreements, twenty-five U.S.-cum-
NATO bases and installations62 were constructed in Turkey, including, most 
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importantly, an air base in İncirlik (Adana) ‘‘connected to the Strategic Air Forces 
Command of NATO, to be turned over to American control in case of a crisis’’63 
with other bases such as the Çiğli (İzmir) Air Base and intelligence-gathering 
installations in Karamürsel (Kocaeli), Trabzon, Belbaşı (Ankara), Pirinçlik 
(Diyarbakır), Sinop and Samsun. Moreover, ‘‘naval facilities and storage facilities 
were established at İskenderun (Hatay) and Yumurtalık (Adana)’’.64 Furthermore, 
Turkey hosted U.S. strike aircraft armed with nuclear weapons ‘‘under an 
agreement reached in 1957, and by the late 1960s the number of U.S. military 
personnel and dependents on Turkish territory would reach 24,000’’.65 Turkey 
allocated 32 million square meters of land for the construction of these bases.66 
Harris maintains that: 
        this rapid increase in personnel evidenced a shift in American interest 
        in Turkey. Initially, Washington had seen defense of Turkey and the 
        blocking of Soviet expansion in the area as its main concerns. Soon,   
        Americans increasingly came to recognize the benefits from using Turkey 
        as a base of operations for intelligence-gathering within the Soviet Union67  
 
and out-of-area operations to intervene in the Middle East. This eventually brought 
the issue of sovereignty to the fore.68 But at that point, the perception of the 
mutuality of goals and interests with the United States caused Turkey to 
downgrade this issue and led it to ‘‘put few restraints on American action’’.69   
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Consequently, ‘‘Soviet allegations in February 1956 that meteorological 
balloons launched by Americans from Turkey were used for espionage purposes 
failed to trigger any significant Turkish reaction.’’70 Turkey cooperated with the 
U.S. in the U-2 program of reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union. ‘‘This 
activity would become an issue of public discussion only after four years of 
uneventful operation when a U-2 plane, which had taken off from the İncirlik Air 
Base in Turkey, was forcibly grounded in the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960.’’71 
After the Soviet Union made public the downing of the reconnaissance plane, ‘‘a 
major diplomatic scandal followed, involving Turkish compliance in violating 
Soviet airspace. The Turkish press treated the matter as if Turkey had not been 
involved at all, and the Turkish government agreed.’’72 On 8 May 1960, Turkey 
announced that it had not given permission for reconnaissance flights from its soil 
and that Turkey ‘‘bore no responsibility for flights outside its airspace. The 
implication was that the Turkish government had no knowledge of such flights, 
though the top echelons of the Turkish General Staff probably knew.’’73 The 
flights were discontinued for the time being. 
In the meantime, American military aid, equipment and training enabled 
Turkey to modernize and increase the strength of its armed forces. ‘‘Total U.S. 
military assistance to Turkey between 1948 and 1964 amounted to $2, 271 million, 
plus $328 million in deliveries of surplus equipment.’’74 All in all, NATO 
membership was a welcome development for the Turks in the 1950s in that, it 
would be very difficult for Turkey to achieve high growth rates, while at the same 
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time deter a Soviet attack, without this military assistance.75 However, this was by 
no means a one-sided relation as Turkey was an indispensable ally for the U.S. 
Moreover, as American Ambassador to Ankara, George McGhee would confess, 
‘‘in exchange for each dollar spent in Turkey, America saved three dollars' worth 
of security.’’76 
Meanwhile, bilateral agreements dealing with specific aspects of the 
Turkish-American military presence in Turkey such as ‘‘U.S. force deployments, 
military exercises by U.S. forces, the legal and administrative status of U.S. forces, 
intelligence activities, operations plans for U.S. forces and operations plans for 
joint force commands’’77 were signed between the two countries. Some of these 
agreements were open i.e. ratified and published by the Turkish parliament while 
some others were ‘‘secret exchanges of notes and executive agreements 
concerning such matters as the deployment of weapons systems in Turkey and the 
right of U.S. personnel to carry on activities of a military or intelligence nature.’’78 
These secret agreements made it difficult for Turkey to exercise effective control 
over the American military presence on its soil. And as Harris (1972: 55-56) notes:  
        already before the end of the 1950s, the opposition would begin to attack 
        on constitutional grounds those agreements not ratified by the Turkish 
        Parliament. While at first these attacks were directed far more at the DP 
        administration than at the United States, in the 1960s, it would be only a  
        short step to centering fire on the United States as well.79 
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2.2.2. Diplomatic cooperation 
 During the 1950s, Turkey engaged itself in two unsuccessful projects to 
form Western defense organizations in the Balkans and in the Middle East as 
Turkey was trying to pursue an active foreign policy in these regions as part of its 
pro-Western foreign policy. Turkey’s primary goal in its policy towards these 
regions was to prove to the West that it was a reliable ally and hence receive more 
financial and military aid. Therefore, Turkey pursued a staunchly pro-Western and 
pro-American foreign policy in especially the Middle East. The Menderes 
government’s staunch anti-communism was another important factor in the pursuit 
of such a foreign policy. 
 Upon American encouragement,80 Turkey persuaded Yugoslavia to forego 
neutrality and on 9 August 1954, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed the 
Balkan Defense Pact, according to which the three countries undertook to help one 
another in case of attack by an outside party (meaning the Soviet Union). Thus, 
Yugoslavia was indirectly brought under NATO’s protective umbrella, that is, if 
Turkey and Greece came to its help in case of an attack. However, this alliance 
soon lost its importance as Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved after the death of 
Stalin and the Cyprus problem emerged as a major bone of contention between 
Turkey and Greece.  
 Turkey's other main foreign policy concern at the time was the Middle 
East. The United States and especially Britain wanted Turkey to pursue an active 
diplomacy in order to convince the Middle Eastern countries to join a military pact 
aimed at containing Soviet advance into the region and at ensuring the security of 
petroleum. During 1951-1953, the formation of a Middle East Defense 
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Organization (MEDO) was contemplated whereby Turkey (because of its promise 
to Britain to work towards the formation a pro-Western organization in the region 
as a pre-condition for British acceptance of Turkey's accession to NATO), the 
United States and Britain tried to bring in the Arabs to the prospective 
organization. But their efforts did not produce the desired result because since the 
end of World War II, the idea of pan-Arabism had emerged and found wide 
support and because the foreign policies of most Arab countries were anti-Western 
while the Soviet threat did not mean much to them.  
The Arabs’ resistance to MEDO did not prevent a renewed effort to 
prevent Soviet penetration into the region. ‘‘The principal promoter’’ of the new 
project ‘‘was the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’’,81 who tried to 
persuade the regional countries to join the new plan. When it was realized that 
most Arab states opposed the scheme, the United States decided to pursue the 
objective of constituting a security organization based on the ‘‘northern tier’’ 
states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, ‘‘where proximity to the Soviet Union induced 
a greater awareness of the communist danger.’’82 This plan was also seen by 
Menderes and Dulles as a way of persuading the Arab states to join another 
version of MEDO. But Western policies had the opposite effect of prompting the 
Arabs to move closer to the Soviet Union and thus allowing the U.S.S.R. to enter 
the equation in Middle Eastern affairs, for Turkey and the United States had again 
misjudged regional dynamics. Nevertheless, this new Dulles policy eventually led 
to the formation of the so-called Baghdad Pact. In 1955, Turkey had signed a 
treaty with Iraq which foresaw military cooperation between the two countries. 
‘‘Turkey had played an active and enthusiastic role in bringing Iraq into this bi-
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lateral arrangement’’, which Menderes saw as an ‘‘important way of increasing 
Turkey’s security along its southern border, and of enhancing Turkey’s value to 
the West as an ally’’.83 Iran, Pakistan and Britain acceded to the Turkish-Iraqi 
‘pact’ in the same year thereby forming the Baghdad Pact.  
The Pact amounted to very little in practical terms due to the lack of 
integrated military forces, fierce Arab opposition and because the U.S. was not an 
official member. But although the United States, in order not to further alienate 
and antagonize the Arabs, did not become a member of the pact, it nevertheless did 
participate in the Pact’s meetings and met much of the expenses. The Pact did not 
provide the Turks with more security or added to its Turkey’s deterrence. The 
main value of it in the eyes of the Democrat Party government was that it 
‘‘represented Turkey another channel for obtaining American military and 
economic aid.84 
 Meanwhile, in April 1955, Turkey attacked the policy of non-alignment at 
the Conference of Afro-Asian Nations at Bandung (which gave birth to the Third 
World Movement) by stressing the threat that communism posed to the world and 
‘‘denouncing the policy of non-alignment by equating it with pacifism’’,85 to the 
chagrin of the participants from Asia and Africa. Moreover, in the same year, it 
voted against Algerian independence in the United Nations General Assembly in 
the context of ‘‘synchronizing’’ its foreign policy with those of its NATO allies. 
Turkey would later come to resent these staunchly pro-Western undertakings for  
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causing Turkey’s isolation in international fora in the 1960s, especially as regards 
the Cyprus conflict. 
In the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, Turkey supported the American policy. 
After the attack by Britain, France and Israel on Egypt, Turkey voted for the 
American motion in the United Nations, calling for an immediate cease-fire.86 In 
the aftermath of the failure at Suez, British power in the Middle East declined 
considerably, while the Soviet Union became a major actor in the politics of the 
region. Consequently, members of the Baghdad Pact, especially Turkey, started to 
pressure the United States government to join the alliance in order to rectify this 
situation. However, after the Suez fiasco, ‘‘Washington was even less willing to 
assume formal membership’’. ‘‘Instead, it produced the Eisenhower Doctrine to 
allay anxieties of the few pro-Western Arab leaders and to give encouragement to 
the members of the Baghdad Pact’’.87 In an address to Congress on January 5, 
1957, President Eisenhower ‘‘invited the U.S. Congress to authorize economic 
cooperation and programs of military assistance, including the deployment of U.S. 
forces to countries ‘‘requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any 
nation controlled by international communism.’’ His proposals were endorsed by 
Congress.88 The Eisenhower Doctrine was widely welcomed by Turkey.89 
By this stage, ‘‘it appeared that Adnan Menderes had a more Dullesian-
than-Dulles phobia about the dangers of communist penetration in the Middle 
East, and that his Western allies had to restrain him from taking a more aggressive 
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stance in the region’’,90 especially towards Syria which had moved close to the 
Soviet Union.91 In 1957, the expulsion of American officials from Syria, because 
they were allegedly conspiring with the help of the Turkish government to topple 
the Syrian government, increased tensions between Ankara and Damascus.92 
Moreover, the Soviet arms transfers to Syria was an unwelcome development for 
Turkey. As a result, Turkey concentrated its military forces near its Syrian border, 
which prompted Soviet mobilization on the Turkish border. According to a 
contemporary British Foreign Office report, Turkey ‘‘seemed to have considered 
‘going it alone’ over Syria’’ if local or international communists took control of 
the Syrian government.’’93 In response, Soviet Premier Khruschev threatened that 
‘‘if the crisis resulted in war, Turkey would not last even a single day.’’94 
Although the U.S. State Department emphasized that ‘‘if Turkey were attacked, it 
would carry out its defense commitments to Turkey with all its power,’’ it 
appeared that the U.S. was ‘‘gravely disturbed by Turkey's apparently aggressive 
attitude towards Syria’’, and feared that ‘‘it might provoke a Soviet attack on 
Turkey which could lead to a full-scale conflict between the two superpowers.’’95 
According to Harris, ‘‘it was hard to tell with any assurance what the DP 
government hoped to gain by its overly aggressive stance towards Syria’’. Perhaps 
the Menderes government wanted to ‘‘dramatize the communist danger in hope of 
assuring greater American support for the Baghdad Pact’’.96 The crisis ended with 
an abrupt change of policy by Khruschev. ‘‘His decision to embark on a peace 
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offensive towards Turkey failed to produce any tangible results in Turkish-Soviet 
relations’’, but it eased tensions and Turkey withdrew its troops.97   
In June 1958, a leftist coup d'etat in Iraq overthrew the pro-Western 
regime. After the coup, it was alleged that Menderes wanted Turkey to intervene 
and remove the coup-makers from power, but was ‘‘dissuaded by the Americans 
from such an act’’.98 However, within two weeks Menderes changed his policy 
and recognized the new Iraqi regime. Following the Iraqi coup, the name of the 
Baghdad Pact was changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the 
headquarters of the ‘new’ organization were moved to Ankara. From then on, ‘‘the 
pact only served as a forum for dialogue between its regional members and the 
United States’’.99  
Shortly after the Iraqi coup, American military forces landed in Lebanon 
following an invitation by the Lebanese president in the context of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, using NATO bases in Turkey (without prior consultation with Turkish 
authorities because the Americans ‘‘due to the need for haste in preparation of the 
force deployment’’ did not notify the Turks until after the military unit had landed 
in İncirlik)100 to transfer their troops to Lebanon for an out-of-area operation which 
fell outside the confines of Turkey’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. This 
American fait accompli led to resentments in some circles in Turkey and ‘‘left 
scars that would eventually contribute to a narrowing of American freedom of 
action’’.101 However, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu praised the 
American action and made the statement that ‘‘the American Ambassador had 
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asked Turkey's prior cooperation to use the İncirlik base, which the Turkish 
government had granted.’’ ‘‘Although the American data contradicted Zorlu's 
statement about timing, the Foreign Minister did not see a fait accompli in the 
matter’’102 and ‘‘the Turkish government overlooked this breach of protocol’’.103  
Turkey’s over-zealously pro-Western foreign policy would later come 
under immense criticism for having alienated the Third World in general, and the 
Arab world in particular. This would lead to Turkey’s international isolation 
regarding the Cyprus issue, which in turn would prompt Turkey to try to make 
amends in its relations with the non-Western world as of 1964. 
Within the context of Turkish-American relations of the era (1945-1964), it 
is beneficial to examine Turkey's relations with the other superpower: Following 
Soviet territorial demands on Turkey, ‘‘relations between the Soviet Union and 
Turkey further deteriorated proportionate to Turkey’s alignment with the 
West’’.104 However, Soviet policies towards Turkey had softened following the 
death of Stalin (shortly after which the Soviet Union renounced its previous 
territorial claims from Turkey and embarked on a peace offensive towards the 
Turks in the context of its new global foreign policy of peaceful coexistence of the 
two blocs105), but this had little effect in changing Turkey’s perceptions of and 
policies towards the Soviet Union as Turkish policy-makers believed that the 
Soviet change of policy was only cosmetic and because Turkey feared that a 
rapprochement with the Soviets could endanger its relations with the United 
States. Moreover, the Soviet efforts to establish close relations with Turkey’s 
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southern neighbors, Syria and Iraq caused a fear of encirclement on Turkey’s part 
and ‘‘the violent crushing of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution only worked to 
confirm Turkish suspicions about ultimate Soviet motives’’.106  Thus, till the mid-
1960s, Turkey would reject Soviet offers of a rapprochement and ‘‘would make 
known their desire that Turkish-Soviet relations would remain within the 
framework of East-West relations’’.107 
 
2.2.3. Economic ties and domestic politics 
 As mentioned previously, Turkey needed American economic and military 
assistance for financing its economic development and the United States needed 
close relations with Turkey for the sake of its national interests, which resulted in 
the extension of aid to the Turks by the United States. Therefore, Turkey 
constantly sought economic aid from the United States, but from the very 
beginning, it was disappointed by the amount of aid that it actually received and 
the strings attached to such aid.108 109 So, in this sense, cooperation in the 
economic field would become a thorny aspect of the Turkish-American 
relationship in the 1950s. According to American observer Ferenc Vali (1971: 
331), ‘‘it was only understandable that the U.S. government and Congress were 
anxious that American taxpayers’ money should be put to proper use.’’110 ‘‘The 
strings attached to U.S. economic assistance criticized by the Turks’’ (during the 
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stabilization fund controversy of the mid-1950s, whereby the U.S. refused to 
provide the $300 million-that Turkey asked from the Americans in order to solve 
its financial problems-unless the DP government promised to take the necessary 
economic austerity measures) ‘‘were seen as necessary concomitants of the 
Turkish dependency on aid and not a result of an American policy to control the 
Turkish economy.’’111 Washington was definitely not happy about having to 
extend economic aid to Turkey. ‘‘But because the American intention was to put 
Turkey (and other aid recipients) on its own feet, it nonetheless appeared 
necessary to control the use of the assistance to produce the optimum results.’’112 
The Turks on the other hand perceived such American pre-conditions as 
interference in Turkish internal affairs. But nevertheless, Taşhan maintains that 
‘‘although various American sources pointed out 1954 as the date for the 
beginning of change in Turkish-American relations’’ after Turkey failed to obtain 
the desired amount of economic assistance from the United States, ‘‘it is difficult 
to say that this failure had any influence that went beyond a sense of mild 
disappointment in Turkey and it certainly evoked no change in the Turkish attitude 
towards the United States’’.113  
As mentioned above, the DP government continuously pressured the 
United States for a $300 million fund to stabilize the Turkish economy between 
1954 and 1958, but American officials rejected the request due to the Democrat 
Party government’s unwillingness to apply rational, and not populist, economic 
policies. In that context, the U.S. called on the Turkish government to cut back 
investments, reduce agricultural subsidies, increase tax rates and significantly 
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devalue the Turkish lira. But this American request ‘‘would mean slower 
economic growth and thus Menderes remained unwilling to adopt these measures 
until he had exhausted every other alternative’’.114 Harris points out that ‘‘for 
almost four years, the Turkish and American governments fought a behind-the-
scenes battle over this issue’’.115 But by 1958, the Turkish economy had come to 
the brink of financial insolvency which compelled Menderes to finally agree to 
apply the American prescriptions. ‘‘To assist him in carrying out these measures, 
the West provided $359 million in credit, of which the big majority came from the 
United States. This eased the economic crisis for the time being’’.116 
 The DP government believed that Turkey's importance to the West would 
force the U.S. to provide extensive economic assistance even if they refused to 
follow an economic policy along the lines requested by the American aid mission. 
Harris believes that ‘‘such a calculation was by no means far-fetched’’. ‘‘While 
the Americans continually pressed Turkey to follow rational economic policies’’, 
the U.S. eventually provided the economic assistance to save Turkey from 
financial insolvency.117 
Meanwhile, it was ‘‘alleged at the time that after the overthrow of the pro-
Western Iraqi regime in 1958, Menderes had begun to appeal to the United States 
to promise help if Turkey was threatened with communists internally’’.118 At about 
the same time, the Middle Eastern members of CENTO were pressing the United 
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States to join the Pact as a full member. Consequently, Washington started 
bilateral negotiations with the Middle Eastern members of CENTO to forge closer 
bilateral relations without becoming a full member of the organization. One 
outcome of this was the signing in 1959 of a Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation 
between the United States and Turkey. According to the agreement, the United 
States agreed, ‘‘in case of ‘internal aggression’ against Turkey to take such 
appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed 
upon in order to assist the Turkish Government at its request.’’119 ‘‘In the Turkish 
context the term ‘internal aggression’ gained special meaning’’,120 for relations 
between the ruling DP and the opposition RPP had begun to deteriorate and the DP 
had imposed restrictions on the press and the opposition. Members of the RPP 
feared that this treaty included an American commitment to suppress the 
opposition upon the DP’s request. ‘‘But, clearly at this stage the reaction caused 
by the Cooperation agreement was directed primarily against the DP and was by 
no means sharply aimed against the U.S. Few Turks were yet essentially 
mistrustful of American motives’’.121 
 
2.3. The aftermath of the 1960 coup and the Cuban missile crisis (1962) 
On May 27, 1960, the Turkish armed forces overthrew the Menderes 
government in order to preserve national unity, ‘‘avert fratricide’’ and prevent the 
breakdown of the political system. The coup-makers feared American intervention 
in view of the aforementioned 1959 Bilateral Agreement, so their first 
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announcement was to assert that Turkey would abide by its foreign policy 
commitments and that it would continue to be a member of NATO and CENTO. 
The Americans were satisfied with the fact that the coup was not directed against 
Turkey’s Western connection and it soon became clear that the U.S. had no 
afterthoughts about recognizing and supporting the military regime. 
There was no major disagreement among members of the junta as regards 
Turkey's foreign policy. They believed that continuing the close alliance 
relationship with the U.S. was in the final analysis, to Turkey’s benefit and they 
therefore rejected Soviet offers of aid and neutrality. Further, ‘‘coming out of 
Turkey’s military tradition, they were reasonably satisfied with Washington’s 
performance, although they did aspire to regulate U.S. personnel more rigorously 
than in the past in order to prevent abuses of extraterritoriality and to ensure the 
application of Turkish laws’’.122 Consequently, no major change would take place 
in either Turkish foreign policy or Turkish-American relations and the catalyst for 
substantial change in relations between the two countries would only come 
following the Cyprus crisis of 1964.  
In the domestic front, the military leaders embarked on a campaign to 
democratize the regime, including the promulgation of a new constitution that 
provided for extensive political rights and freedoms. This would lead to changes 
that would eventually have important effects on Turkey’s foreign policy 
orientation. Civilian government was eventually restored and after general 
elections in October 1961, a coalition government under İsmet İnönü's leadership 
was established.  
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Meanwhile, in 1959, Turkey had signed a bilateral agreement with the 
United States whereby it agreed to install on its soil, fifteen intermediate-range 
Jupiter ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads. The missiles became 
operational in the spring of 1962 and were subject to the dual-key system, that is, 
they could only be used with the joint permission of the American and Turkish 
governments. What prompted the United States to take such an action was the 
‘‘Soviet development of a long-range missile initiated by the Sputnik experiment 
in 1957’’.  
        The myth of a missile gap between the US and the USSR soon 
        became prevalent in the American media and although the U.S. policy- 
        makers knew better, the myth had to be propagated perhaps in order to  
        justify military/defense spending coupled with the policy of  
        strengthening the Atlantic linkage.123  
 
The main reasons for the Turkish decision-makers to want strategic nuclear 
missiles on Turkish territory, despite the risk of causing problems with and being 
the potential nuclear target of a neighboring super power in case of a war and even 
though weapons of mass destruction are not necessarily defensive, were enhancing 
Turkey’s deterrence against the Soviet bloc, displaying solidarity with the 
American ally and ‘‘the hope of increasing the United States' strategic dependence 
on Turkey. Increased aid from the U.S. could follow at a time when Turkey was in 
dire economic straits’’.124 ‘‘Promoting mutual dependence also seemed to be an 
insurance against a possible East-West rapprochement’’.125 
Meanwhile, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had 
realized that the Jupiters had been rendered obsolete by technological 
developments. Accordingly, on several occasions during 1961 and 1962, U.S. 
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President John Kennedy asked for a review of the decision to deploy the missiles, 
only to be met with vehement Turkish opposition. Consequently, the Jupiters were 
still in Turkey when the Cuban missile crisis erupted in the fall of 1962. 
This exposed Turkey to the risk of being faced with nuclear annihilation 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and made it the subject of super 
power secret diplomacy and turned it into a bargaining chip. In return for the U.S. 
promise to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey (without consulting the 
Turkish government), the Soviets agreed to withdraw their missiles from Cuba. 
Nevertheless, at the time, ‘‘it appeared’’ to the public at large ‘‘that the Soviet 
missiles were withdrawn from Cuba without the U.S. having to make any 
concessions on the Turkish Jupiters’’. ‘‘This was the line that was held by both the 
Kennedy administration and the İnönü government’’.126 However, in his memoirs 
published in 1968, President Kennedy's brother, U.S. Attorney-General Robert 
Kennedy confessed that, ‘‘on the president's instructions, he had met the Soviet 
ambassador, Dobrynin on 27 October, that is, before Khruschev's letter agreeing to 
the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles had been received.’’ He had told the 
ambassador that ‘‘if the Soviets agreed to withdraw its missiles, it was their 
judgement that, within a short time after the crisis was over, the Jupiters would be 
gone.’’127 So the Kennedy administration had bargained with the Soviet Union 
over Turkey’s interests without consulting its government.   
‘‘Turkey proved to be more sensitive to this breach of protocol than to the 
removal of the missiles. Moreover, being presented with what was perceived as a 
fait accompli upset Turkish confidence about the absolute commitment of the 
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United States to Turkey’s defense’’.128 As George E. Gruen concluded, ‘‘the seeds 
were sown for a lingering suspicion in Ankara that Washington might be tempted 
by superpower considerations to bargain away Turkey's security interests’’129 and 
‘‘the stage was set for a reevaluation of links with the United States’’.130 Turkish 
foreign policy makers started to realize that being a NATO member was not 
necessarily tantamount to increased security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The 
danger of nuclear annihilation that the crisis caused for Turkey led to criticism 
against the uni-dimensional Turkish foreign policy of almost exclusive 
dependence on the U.S. On a positive note, with the removal of the Jupiters, 
Turkey was no longer a major target in a possible nuclear war and this removed an 
important obstacle before the improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations and 
underscored the need to adopt more flexible policies vis-a-vis the superpowers in 
the second half of the 1960s. But because the super power bargain was not known 
to the public at large at the time, it did not lead to much public criticism of the 
United States in Turkey and in any event, the much more important Cyprus crisis 
of 1964 would eclipse the effects of the Cuban missile crisis on Turkish-American 
relations.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
ADAPTING TO CHANGE: TURKISH-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS BETWEEN 1964-1974 
 
 
 
3.1. The 1964 Cyprus crisis 
 
 The Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 with the end of British 
colonial rule. The Greek Cypriot nationalist movement, which aimed to gain the 
island’s independence from Britain and then achieve enosis i.e. union of the island 
with Greece, had ‘‘gained momentum in the 1950s and started to challenge British 
rule.’’ ‘‘Turkey became a party to the dispute when the possibility of ending 
British rule began to be discussed.’’131 Eventually, a compromise was reached 
between the Greek, Turkish and British governments in 1959-1960 through the 
Zurich-London Agreements. A federal constitution establishing a bi-communal 
checks and balances system to safeguard the security and protection of the rights 
of the outnumbered Turkish Cypriots was elaborated. The island became 
independent and an alliance agreement was signed between Greece, Turkey, 
Britain and Cyprus. Moreover, Britain, Turkey and Greece, through a treaty of 
guarantee, would jointly insure the protection of the constitutional order and each 
had the right to intervene on the island jointly or independently if the 
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constitutional order was violated.132 Taşhan (Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus: 
166) argues that ‘‘the West was content with the signing of these treaties because 
it would eliminate a source of conflict between Turkey and Greece.’’ ‘‘The 
Communist world was also pleased with the creation of a new non-aligned country 
open for the possible future development of communism.’’133  
However, the Greek Cypriot president of the republic, Archbishop 
Makarios and Greek nationalists considered the creation of the Republic of Cyprus 
as only the first step towards the realization of their eventual goal i.e. enosis. Even 
though the 1959-1960 Agreements that they had signed ruled out enosis, they 
intended to overthrow these agreements. Thus, soon after independence, Makarios 
began to complain that the constitution hampered effective governance. In 
December 1963, he proposed thirteen constitutional amendments to the Turkish 
side which, if implemented, would do away with most of the special rights of the 
Turkish community on the island and hence reduce them into a mere minority. The 
Turkish Cypriots vehemently refused the proposals and were forced to withdraw 
from the Cyprus government. Tensions on the island began to rise. On December 
21, 1963, the Greek Cypriots launched an attack on the Turkish community in 
order to solve the problem through the use of force, which led Turkey to 
contemplate a military intervention in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots. 
‘‘From early on, Turkish Prime Minister İnönü had wanted the United States to 
address the problem,’’134 but was informed by the U.S. Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, ‘‘that the U.S. was not a party to the conflict’’.135 136  ‘‘To underline the 
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urgency of the problem, Turkey flew its jets over the island on December 25, 
1963.’’137 This action led to a failed attempt by the three guarantor powers to 
negotiate over the establishment of a peacekeeping force to be stationed on the 
island. ‘‘Inter-communal fighting prompted by the Greek Cypriots to coerce the 
Turkish Cypriots into accepting the constitutional demands continued.’’138 The 
Turkish prime minister told the American Ambassador in Ankara, Raymond Hare 
on January 28 that ‘‘unless the rights of the Turkish Cypriots were assured, Turkey 
would have to exercise its legal right under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and 
intervene on the island.’’139 As a result of İnönü’s warning, an Anglo-American 
plan, which foresaw the establishment of a NATO peacekeeping force to be 
stationed on the island, was prepared. However, Makarios, who was following a 
policy of non-alignment and believed that a NATO force in Cyprus would help 
consolidate the Zurich-London Agreements, rejected the plan. Efforts to convince 
him to accept the plan failed. Soon after, Makarios unilaterally abrogated the 1960 
Treaty of Alliance with Britain, Greece and Turkey and ‘‘decided to form a 
Cypriot army, a decision in contravention of the 1959-1960 Agreements.’’140   
These developments and the escalation of attacks on the Turkish 
community led Turkey to consider a military intervention on the island once again. 
‘‘The U. S. was still trying to not get actively involved in the conflict, hoping that 
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Britain, Turkey and Greece would be able to find a solution.’’141 On June 4, 1964, 
İsmet İnönü told the U.S. Ambassador Hare that Turkey would intervene on 
Cyprus. Mr. Hare asked for a postponement so that he could consult his 
government. İnönü accepted. ‘‘Washington reacted to İnönü’s apparent 
determination with haste.’’142 The next day, the Turkish government received a 
very harshly-worded letter from American President Lyndon Johnson,143 asking 
Turkey not to stage a military intervention. The letter, written in a condescending 
style, rejected İnönü’s assertion that all peaceful means had been tried and stated 
that Turkey did not yet have the  right to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus. 
Moreover, it implied that NATO might not come to the defense of Turkey if its 
unilateral action led to a Soviet intervention ‘‘(Given that the Soviet government 
had been strongly supportive of Makarios, this was not an empty threat).’’144 
Johnson said:  
        I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance           
        to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the   
        Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention 
        without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies. 
 
He then pointed out that he was committed to a peaceful means of finding a 
solution to the problem and invited İnönü to the United States to settle the problem 
through negotiations.  
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 ‘‘İnönü, not surprisingly, decided to cancel the intervention and accepted 
Johnson’s offer of negotiations.’’145 ‘‘His visit to Washington took place on 22 
and 23 June 1964, and there he was persuaded by President Johnson that the U.S. 
would now take things more firmly in its hands.’’146 Both İnönü and Greek Prime 
Minister Papandreou agreed to the appointment of former U.S. Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson as Johnson’s Cyprus mediator.147 ‘‘Papandreou at first seemed 
reluctant to accept an American mediation, but Dean Rusk convinced him by 
saying that Johnson would not forestall a new Turkish landing attempt, and even if 
he tried it was doubtful that the Turks would listen to him again.’’148 
 The Turkish and Greek representatives met with Mr. Acheson in Geneva 
on 14 July 1964. His plan foresaw the union of Cyprus with Greece; for a military 
base in the north under full Turkish sovereignty and several Turkish cantons 
exercising local autonomy. Turkey was ready to accept the plan, provided that the 
base area was sufficiently big, covering the whole Karpas Peninsula. The Greeks 
however, did not want to cede land to Turkey permanently and were only willing 
to offer a smaller military base for 25 years. Before discussions on the plan started, 
violence once more erupted in Cyprus when Greek Cypriot forces attacked a 
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Turkish enclave, prompting a Turkish bombardment on the Greek Cypriot forces 
on 8 and 9 August, which led the UN Security Council to adopt a cease-fire 
resolution, and ‘‘Khruschev to intimidate Ankara with ‘grave consequences’.’’149 
İnönü and Makarios accepted the cease-fire and the negotiations resumed in 
Geneva on 15 August 1964. Yet the revised ‘‘second’’ Acheson Plan was not 
satisfying to Turkey because it now foresaw the leasing-instead of cession-to 
Turkey of a small base.150  Makarios rejected the plan, too, for he couldn’t settle 
for anything less than enosis of the entire island. Therefore, the Geneva 
Conference ended in failure.151  
After the December 1963 and August 1964 battles in Cyprus, the 
conditions which the Zurich-London Agreements foresaw ‘‘ceased to exist.’’152 
Cypriot Turks had to withdraw into small, land-locked enclaves and constantly 
faced the danger of massacres by the numerically superior Greek Cypriots. They 
stopped the efforts to participate in the Greek-led Cyprus government, which was 
internationally recognized as the legitimate government of the whole island. Greek 
Cypriots on the other hand, started a blockade over the Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves.153 Moreover, Greece managed to infiltrate 20,000 troops into the island 
between 1964 and 1967.154  
 The U.S. Administration, meanwhile, was ‘‘growing frustrated with the 
failure of its mediation,’’ believing that ‘‘the Geneva negotiations had stood a 
good chance of success had it not been the interference of Makarios,’’ on whom 
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the United States had very little influence, ‘‘forcing Papandreou to be 
intransigent.’’155 Moreover, Makarios’s cordial relations with the Third World and 
the communist world displeased the American government, which consequently 
started to favor enosis or partition of Cyprus. 
 
3.2. The Johnson letter 
As mentioned above, President Johnson tried to avert a Turkish 
intervention on Cyprus by implying in his letter that the U.S. would not come to 
Turkey’s help if the Soviets attacked Turkey following a Turkish intervention on 
Cyprus. He also told İnönü that, under article four of the Aid to Turkey Agreement 
of 1947, ‘‘Turkey was required to obtain America’s consent for the use of military 
assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished.’’ 
Johnson added, ‘‘I must tell you in all candor that the U.S. cannot agree to the use 
of any American-supplied equipment for Turkish intervention in Cyprus under 
present circumstances.’’156 
 In his reply to the letter, İnönü maintained that ‘‘if the commitment of an 
alliance was conditional, this would destroy the credibility of the alliance,’’ adding 
that ‘‘in case of such an event, a new world order would be established and Turkey 
would take its place in that order.’’157 158 He maintained that:  
        One condition of the 1947 Aid to Turkey agreement regarding U.S. 
        military assistance to Turkey was that it conformed to the principles of 
        independence and security of the two countries. This aid was given in 
        return for Turkey’s placing at American disposal a number of facilities 
        intended for joint use. Thus, the requirement that Turks must use their 
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        army and equipment only with the consent of the U.S. would contradict the 
        independence of Turkey.159 
 
 According to Seyfi Taşhan (Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on the 
Centenary of Harry Truman’s Birthday: 9), this new American perception 
‘‘marked a change’’ in Turkish-American relations. He asserts that ‘‘this change 
when compared with an incident that took place only six years earlier’’ showed 
how radically the American view of the alliance had been altered.160 ‘‘In 1958, 
during the crisis at Lebanon, Turkey was rumored to have had troop 
concentrations along the Syrian border. Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev had 
threatened to overrun Turkey if Turkey attacked Syria. At that time, the reaction of 
the U.S. government was swift and categorical: ‘‘any Soviet attack on Turkey 
would meet with the automatic response of the Atlantic Alliance’’. ‘‘The Johnson 
letter was therefore considered as a step back’’ and interpreted as ‘‘introducing an 
arbitrariness into the functioning of the Alliance.’’161  
The reasons for this change of perception and attitude on the American part 
deserve closer examination: According to Oral Sander (1975:18), ‘‘the nuclear 
balance of power of the early 1950s had been transformed into a nuclear balance 
of terror, which stabilized the relations between the two super powers.’’162 Further, 
international relations of the 1950s and Cold War politics were different from 
international relations in the 1960s and détente (i.e. the improvement in the 
relations between the two super powers) politics. Moreover, the advent of long-
range missiles meant that the U.S. no longer needed air bases in Turkey to be able 
to hit the Soviet Union. These changes meant that Turkey’s role and strategic 
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importance in NATO and in the Cold War diminished and Turkey’s influence 
would follow suit. According to him, ‘‘this helps explain the change in American 
behavior.’’163  
 Members of the Johnson Administration on the other hand maintained that, 
‘‘President Johnson and his senior advisers were so concerned lest a Turkish move 
against Cyprus precipitate war between Greece and Turkey that they hastily 
dispatched such a letter.’’ According to the advisers who participated in its 
drafting, ‘‘the harshness of the tone-reflecting the shortness of time and also the 
exasperation that the specter of Turkish intervention could not be laid to rest-
seemed essential to head off Turkish action.’’164 
 
3.2.1. The effects of the Johnson letter 
Although the Johnson letter was not made public for the next eighteen 
months, its contents were partially leaked to the Turkish press by the Turkish 
government soon after its receipt. Turkey, in both official and public opinion level, 
was shocked by the letter’s harsh tone and particularly by Mr. Johnson’s 
implication that NATO might not necessarily and automatically come to Turkey’s 
help against the Soviets, which led to questions concerning the reliability of the 
American commitments. The letter led to resentment against and disillusionment 
with the United States as the Turks felt abandoned by the U.S. despite Turkey’s 
total loyalty to the Western Alliance. Moreover, restraining only Turkey from 
intervention was perceived by the Turks as taking the Greek side by ‘‘permitting a 
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buildup of Greek Cypriot forces equipped with foreign arms, which could be used 
to attack and liquidate the Turkish community at will.’’165 The letter left a long-
lasting legacy on Turkish-American relations and ‘‘from that time forth,’’ noted 
Harris, ‘‘all Turkish governments would be on the defensive in regard to the 
American connection, and the memories of the Johnson letter would color popular 
impressions of the United States for the years to come’’.166 The letter also 
indicated to Turkish policy makers that the national security interests of the two 
countries were not necessarily congruent and that, in American eyes, Turkey’s 
strategic importance was not as important as it once used to be. Furthermore, the 
Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the subsequent Johnson letter made Turkish foreign 
policy makers realize that the uni-dimensional and uncautious foreign policy (of 
overdependence on the U.S. and the urge to follow a policy similar to that of the 
Americans) that had been followed in the 1950s and early 1960s had caused 
Turkey to become dependent on the U.S.A. and restricted its freedom of action. As 
of that date, the close Turkish-American alliance relationship, which began with 
the Truman Doctrine and reached its peak in the 1950s and early 1960s, would 
begin to cool. A torrent of public protests against the U.S. ensued and the letter, 
along with other factors, was instrumental in ushering an anti-American aura in 
Turkey.167 In this context, the 1964 Cyprus conflict and the following Johnson 
letter became the catalysts for the need to implement changes in Turkish foreign 
policy and thus follow a more multi-dimensional course. And, as of 1964, Turkey 
would embark on an attempt to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, the 
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Third World and Middle Eastern countries in the context of its new, multi-
dimensional foreign policy.  
Having said these, the pro-Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy 
would never be questioned at the policy-making level. Turkey did want to retain 
its NATO membership and continue the relations with the United States as the 
main aspect of its defense and foreign policy, but its relationship with the 
Americans and the Atlantic Alliance would be altered, and Turkey’s dependency 
on them would be lessened in order to ensure greater freedom of action in foreign 
policy. 
However, it would be an oversimplification to base the changes, as of 
1964, in Turkish-American relations and in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the 
non-Western world only on the Johnson letter. In the 1960s, there were also 
‘‘important systemic and internal changes’’ that led Turkey to ‘‘re-evaluate its 
strictly Western orientation.’’168 Mustafa Aydın (2000: 115) points out that: 
        The detente process and the consequent loosening of the bipolar 
        balance, which had initiated important changes in world politics,  
        also greatly affected Turkey’s international position. The Cold War had 
        earlier necessitated, on the one hand, Turkey’s dependency on the U.S., 
        but on the other, also sustained unquestioning Western support either 
        militarily or  politically including  economic aid. During the 1950s the 
        Soviet threat was felt by Turkey so much that there was no reason for 
        on the Turkish part to question its total dependence on the West, as long  
        as the West (mainly the U.S.) committed itself to protect Turkey from Soviet  
        aggression. But, the 1960s witnessed a softening of inter-bloc tensions.169  
 
Although, international relations continued to be dominated by the two super 
powers, the thaw in the Cold War decreased the animosity between the two blocs 
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and ‘‘gave smaller states a considerable degree of autonomy in their foreign 
policies.’’170  
Moreover, partly as a result of the thaw in the Cold War and partly due to 
the Soviets’ continuous overtures for better relations with Turkey, there took place 
a change in Turkish perceptions of the U.S.S.R., whereby the Soviets no longer 
seemed as big a threat to Turkey’s security. Further, Turkish foreign policy makers 
had realized that Soviet support for the Greek Cypriots seriously weakened 
Turkey’s position on the Cyprus question and ‘‘made it more vulnerable to 
American pressure.’’ Since the Soviet government had desired an improvement in 
its relations with Turkey since 1953, ‘‘the Soviet-Turkish détente developed 
quickly’’.171  
Another international development that prompted a change in Turkish 
foreign policy was the adoption by first the Kennedy Administration, then by 
NATO of the strategy of ‘‘flexible response and limited war’’ following the 
achievement of nuclear parity between the two superpowers. This development led 
to doubts in Turkish minds that NATO would not come to the Turks’ help aid if 
Turkey were attacked by the U.S.S.R. This could mean that their allies could 
possibly sacrifice the Turks to receive a concession from the Soviet bloc. ‘‘For the 
Turks then, the emergence of détente and the aforementioned strategic and 
technological developments signified a loss of bargaining power with the West, a 
bargaining power based on the Cold War and Turkey’s strategic position.’’172 This 
reinforced trends towards the adoption of a more independent and multi-
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dimensional foreign policy. Moreover, the import substitution economic policy 
adopted in the early 1960s accentuated Turkey’s need to find foreign financing. As 
aid from the U.S. was declining, Turkey would have to improve its economic 
relations with the non-Western world.173 
In such a changed international environment, Turkey could afford to and 
did need to follow a more diversified and multi-dimensional foreign policy and 
improve its economic and political relations with the Soviet bloc and the Third 
World. Parallel to these international developments, Aydın (2000: 16) asserts that 
‘‘Turkey had gone through important socio-political changes, a combination of 
which affected the approach of Turkish people to the matters of foreign policy.’’174  
Up to the early 1960s, Turkish foreign policy decision making and 
implementation was conducted by a very small group of elites, which included the 
President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and there was very little, if 
any, public criticism of government foreign policy. However, after the 1960 coup 
and the promulgation of a very liberal constitution in 1961, which enhanced 
pluralism in Turkish politics, foreign policy became a topic of parliamentary 
debates and started to attract much more public attention. Further, ‘‘the new 
electoral law introduced a system of proportional representation which allowed 
small parties to enter the Parliament and therefore created a multiplicity of views 
in foreign policy.’’175  
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 ‘‘Along with a pluralist parliament, the new system also created a plural 
society’’176 by providing for extensive rights and freedoms. Under this air of 
freedom, foreign policy issues became an important part of public discussion and 
consequently, public opinion, the majority of which wanted a re-orientation in 
Turkey’s foreign relations, began to exercise more pressure on governmental 
foreign policy.  
        Yet another factor which was to indirectly contribute to the reorientation  
        of Turkey’s foreign policy was the emergence, following the 1961 
        Constitution, for the first time in Turkey’s history of a genuine socialist 
        movement, which advocated the destruction of Turkey’s ties with the West  
        and the normalization of relations with the non-aligned and communist 
        countries.177  
 
Its anti-Western and anti-American campaign started to win supporters from the 
masses after the Cyprus crisis of 1964. As a result of these domestic 
developments, the Turkish leadership became more receptive to public opinion 
and this was an important factor that led them to re-evaluate Turkey’s foreign 
policy with more emphasis on relations with the Middle East and the Soviet Union 
and to follow a more independent policy vis-à-vis the United States. 
However, Mustafa Aydın (2000: 119) claims that:  
        In terms of fostering a new direction in Turkish foreign policy, 
        the developments stated above affected only a limited circle of  
        politicians and intellectuals until the Cyprus crisis. Not until the 
        Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the following Johnson letter did the 
        emerging independent policy trend at the top find wide support.  
        Cyprus and the following Johnson letter, then, were the 
        catalysts which compelled Turkey to re-examine its foreign policy in 
        the light of a rapidly changing world system.178  
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3.2.2. Turkey’s more independent and multi-faceted foreign policy 
As a result of the aforementioned developments, Turkey embarked on a 
foreign policy course of reducing its political, military and economic dependence 
on the United States and NATO and developing its relations with the non-Western 
world. The Turks no longer automatically followed American policies as they 
concluded that Turkish and American national interests were not necessarily 
confluent. Military relations between Turkey and the U.S. would come to develop 
within the NATO framework, too and not merely on a bilateral level and Turkey 
would no longer automatically allow the use of NATO-cum-American bases on its 
soil for non-NATO purposes. Bilateral agreements between the two countries 
would be revised and ‘‘any concessions granted to Americans in Turkey that went 
beyond privileges extended by other NATO members would be repealed.’’179 
Turkey would also try to reduce its dependency on American aid. Nevertheless, 
Turkish foreign policy makers did not rule out cooperation with the U.S. and did 
not contemplate pulling out of NATO,180 but ‘‘ceased to follow  American policies 
automatically and tried to make a decision concerning each foreign policy issue 
only after due consideration was given with regard to Turkish national 
interests.’’181 
 To give a few tangible examples of this new policy, Turkey, in 1965, 
withdrew its support, due to Soviet objections, to the plan to establish a 
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Multilateral Force (MLF) of nuclear within NATO. ‘‘In 1965, it for the first time 
criticized the United States’ Vietnam policy.’’182 ‘‘In 1968, it refused to allow 
NATO maneuvers to be held along the Syrian border because of the unrest in the 
Middle East.’’183 Between 1966 and 1969, it renegotiated the bilateral agreements 
between itself and the United States and consequently, it started to exercise more 
control over the American military presence on Turkish soil.  
 The U.S., on the other hand, in order not to further harm relations with the 
Turks, sought to calm down Turkey. For example, in order ‘‘to mitigate the fears 
provoked by the Johnson letter,’’ it repeatedly ‘‘assured’’ Turkey that it would 
come to Turkey’s help ‘‘if it was attacked by the U.S.S.R. while using its treaty 
rights on Cyprus.’’184 Moreover, in 1965, ‘‘it even voted against a UN General 
Assembly resolution favoring the Greek position,’’ although it ‘‘generally 
sympathized with the Resolution.185’’ 
 
3.2.2.1. Turkish-Soviet relations in the post-1964 era 
One of Ankara’s main tasks in the context of its new foreign policy was to 
improve relations with the Soviet Union. Turkish foreign policy makers placed 
only two conditions on the establishment of good relations between the two 
countries, namely, a more balanced attitude towards the Cyprus issue and 
acceptance of Turkey’s membership in NATO.  
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‘‘The Soviet Union, which had been trying to woo Ankara since the death 
of Stalin reacted vigorously.’’186 In order to take advantage of the problems in 
Turkish-American relations, the U.S.S.R. now adopted a more neutral policy in the 
Cyprus dispute. Visits of high level officials ensued, culminating in an exchange 
of visits by the Presidents in 1969. In 1972, the two countries signed a Declaration 
on the Principles of Good Neighborly Relations, ‘‘although this did not amount to 
much in practical terms.’’187  
Trade and economic relations between the two parties increased. The 
Soviets extended  $200 million in an economic assistance program to construct 
seven major industrial facilities on concessional terms.188 As a result of these 
developments, Turkish-Soviet relations moved very rapidly from hostility towards 
a rapprochement. Harris (1972: 24) points out that, ‘‘in part, the enthusiasm of the 
Turks represented the depths of their disappointment with U.S. policy towards 
Cyprus. But it also expressed pent up relief that once again normal, rather than 
hostile, relations were possible with the northern neighbor.’’189 A rapprochement 
with the Soviets gave Turkey not only the chance to receive a substantial amount 
of economic aid, but also provided it with increased security. 
 Yet, there were limits to this rapprochement, for it was hard for the Turkish 
leaders to be sure that the Soviet Union had fully abandoned its revisionist policy 
towards Turkey and its plans to control the Turkish Straits, and because orientation 
towards the West remained a core principle of Turkish foreign policy. 
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3.2.2.2. Changes in post-1964 Turkish-Middle East/Third World relations 
In the early 1960s, as a result of Turkey’s over-zealously pro-Western 
policies in the 1950s, ‘‘its credit with the’’ Third World and with Middle Eastern 
countries ‘‘was bankrupt.’’190 The UN General Assembly’s acceptance of Greek 
Cypriot theses in 1964 and 1965 attested to the failure of Turkey’s foreign policy 
of the 1950s. It also showed how isolated Turkey was in the international arena 
and accentuated the need to reduce this isolation by improving relations with the 
Third World in general and the Middle East in particular. According to Sander 
(1987: 57-58), ‘‘another factor that had an impact on the Turkish change of heart 
towards the non-aligned bloc was the deterioration of Turkish-American relations. 
The Johnson letter had clearly showed to the Turkish government that a more 
balanced foreign policy had become a necessity.’’191  
Consequently, as of 1964, Turkey embarked on an attempt to improve its 
relations with the Third World and the Middle East. It tried to convince them that 
it had abandoned the policies of the 1950s. Accordingly, it sent goodwill missions 
to Third World countries and started an economic aid program to Africa. In its 
attitude towards Middle East crises, it started to act more cautiously, ‘‘carefully 
weighing the pluses and minuses of each potential action and deciding 
accordingly.’’192 Hence, it started to tilt towards the Arab position in the Arab-
Israeli dispute. In the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, it did not permit the United 
States to use Turkish bases for aiding Israel and it tried to refrain from taking sides 
in intra-Arab disputes. 
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As a result of this new foreign policy, relations between Turkey and the 
Arabs were normalized. As political ties developed, economic relations followed 
suit. But as in the case of Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union, there were 
limitations to further development of relations for Turkish governments had 
always given top priority to the West in their foreign policy and saw relations with 
the Middle East as complementary to Turkey’s Western connection, not as a 
substitute for it. Moreover, continuing Third World/Arab suspicions concerning 
Turkey’s extensive ties with the Western world prevented the further improvement 
of relations.  
 
 
3.3. The rise of anti-Americanism 
 
Following the Cyprus dispute, ‘‘persistent public questioning of American 
motives began’’193 and there took place a sharp increase in anti-American 
sentiment and anti-American protests in Turkey.  A variety of accusations started 
to be directed towards the U.S. To name a few, ‘‘American military presence and 
the bilateral agreements violated Turkish sovereignty; the U.S. interfered in 
Turkish domestic affairs; the Americans were secretly given the right to occupy 
Turkish territory in case of a domestic uprising.’’194 ‘‘These accusations against 
the U.S. and NATO were refuted by Turkish officials and denounced by moderate 
press organs,’’195 but to no avail.  The growth of this phenomenon negatively 
affected Turkish-American relations in the 1960s and made cooperation in many 
fields very difficult. 
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This anti-American feeling was caused by many factors: For one thing, 
Taşhan (Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus: 170) asserts that ‘‘on the problem of 
Cyprus, which stirred so much national feeling in Turkey, the Turkish public 
opinion thought that ‘‘the U.S. had twice restrained and tied Turkey’s hands 
without being able to obtain a quid pro quo from the Greek side.’’196 
Consequently, people ‘‘of all political persuasions took to the streets to protest the 
American role in blocking Turkey.’’197 Second, there was a widespread belief that 
the U.S. breached Turkish sovereignty. Third, some Turks, especially those from 
the radical left distrusted the U.S. due to its allegedly ‘‘imperialist’’ foreign policy. 
Fourth, there was a widespread belief that ‘‘the strings attached to American 
economic aid created a ‘‘colonial dependency’’ on the part of Turkey’’198 and that 
the U.S. controlled Turkish domestic and foreign policies through its proxies in the 
Turkish political establishment. Fifth, the rise of the radical left and the Turkish 
Labor Party (TLP) and their staunchly anti-American propaganda led to a general 
climate of suspicion of the U.S. among Turkish society at large. Sixth, the 1962 
Cuban Crisis made Turkey realize that the Americans could bargain away 
Turkey’s interests. Seventh, during the opium controversy of the 1960s and 1970s, 
the American attitude towards Turkey was considered condescending and led to 
resentments amongst Turks. These factors reinforced each other and led to the 
rapid rise of anti-American feelings. 
 Criss (2002: 472) maintains that ‘‘while subtle acts of resistance came 
from the military and other government officials’’ as a reaction to the United 
States’ actions that challenged Turkey’s sovereignty, ‘‘most protests came from 
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the ideologically-motivated radical left.’’199 And although government-to-
government relations improved as of 1968-1969 (following the Cyrus Vance’s 
mediation effort whereby he was successful in solving the 1967 Cyprus crisis in a 
way satisfactory to the Turks and after the signing in 1969 of the Defense 
Cooperation Agreement), ‘‘the extreme left’’ in Turkey increased its ‘‘agitation 
against the U.S.’’ ‘‘In the universities and public meetings, anti-American and 
anti-NATO slogans became customary.’’200   
 
3.3.1. Sovereignty and anti-Americanism 
 As indicated earlier, throughout the 1950s, Turkey had felt little need to 
restrict American activity on its soil. In turn, the Americans had abused this 
freedom of action by using it for purposes other than merely containing 
communism. Consequently, ‘‘friction between the Turkish and American 
militaries began to increase’’ and Turkey began to be more sensitive towards 
breaches of its sovereignty in the 1960s.201 To give but a few examples, in the 
1958 Lebanon crisis, the Americans had used Turkish bases to land marines in 
Lebanon without prior consultation with the Turks. In the U-2 incident of 1960, 
the Turkish Foreign Ministry had announced that the government had not given 
permission to the U.S. for reconnaissance flights using bases in Turkey implying 
that the Turkish government was not aware of such flights. This was followed by a 
similar incident in 1965 when an American reconnaissance aircraft crashed into 
the Black Sea. Despite Turkish opposition, ‘‘the U.S. military mission’’ insisted 
on ‘‘investigating the accident themselves’’. ‘‘An American destroyer did not 
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acknowledge Turkish warnings and tried to force its way through the Bosphorus,’’ 
before it was stopped by Turkish naval ships. Following the investigation, the 
Turks ‘‘concluded that the American pilot was flying over the Soviet border before 
his plane crashed.’’202 The same year, the Demirel government banned 
reconnaissance flights from Turkish territory. ‘‘But the ban did not prevent a 
similar incident in 1967’’ when a reconnaissance aircraft was ‘‘grounded by the 
Soviets when the airplane entered Soviet airspace.’’ The Turks accepted ‘‘the 
American account that the aircraft was on a cultural mission, but the general’s 
tenure in Turkey was short-lived.’’203 
 ‘‘As a result of these incidents, Turkey began to exercise more control over 
U.S. installations on Turkish territory.’’204 Consequently, Turkey, in three 
occasions, disallowed the U.S. to use bases in Turkey for out-of-area purposes.205 
Moreover, the bilateral agreements between the two countries were renegotiated 
and consequently, relations were put on a more equal footing, as a result of which, 
the Turks started to exercise more control over American military activity on 
Turkish soil. 
 
3.3.2. Ideologically motivated anti-Americanism 
 As mentioned above, the liberal 1961 Constitution led to the emergence of 
a strong socialist movement in Turkey. The new constitution also led to increased 
political activity among leftists, who among other things, wanted Turkish  
withdrawal from NATO and an end to Turkey’s American connection, while 
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‘‘anti-Americanism and anti-Vietnam War sentiments helped fuel their 
radicalism.’’206 Soon after, they established the Turkish Labor Party (TLP).  
‘‘When in 1963 the TLP made public the contents of the secret bilateral 
agreements between Turkey and the United States, the government was obliged to 
renegotiate them because some clauses were incompatible with Turkish 
sovereignty.’’ But the radical left wanted Turkey to ‘‘withdraw from NATO 
altogether.’’207 At the time of the 1964 Cyprus crisis, there were widespread 
nationalist, anti-American demonstrations. The radical left skillfully manipulated 
these strong nationalist feelings and protests and succeeded in generating a general 
aura of suspicion of and resentment against the U.S. among Turkish society at 
large. Anti-American demonstrations by the leftists, the workers and the university 
youth became ordinary and widespread. The American presence in Turkey, 
military and civilian, was the major target for attack of the radical left’s staunch 
anti-Americanism. In late 1967, when President Johnson’s mediator for the 1967 
Cyprus crisis, Mr. Cyrus Vance, arrived in Ankara, due to the anti-American 
demonstrations at the civilian airport, his aircraft had to land at the military airport. 
When the U.S. Sixth Fleet visited İstanbul in 1968, leftist university students 
protested and some American sailors were thrown into the sea. Consequently, the 
Americans tried to make their presence in Turkey ‘‘less visible’’ and the ‘‘number 
of Americans in Turkey’’, along with the visits of the Sixth Fleet, were 
‘‘reduced.’’208 209  
        A parallel undertaking was the transfer of the Çiğli Airport in İzmir 
        and the radar bases at Trabzon and Samsun to the Turkish Armed Forces,  
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        while the status of the radar bases at Karamürsel (Kocaeli), Sinop and  
        Pirinçlik (Diyarbakır) and of the İncirlik airport in Adana were adjusted 
        to the principles of the Defense and Cooperation Agreement of 1969.210 
  
   Meanwhile, defeat in the 1969 elections211 led to disillusionment in some 
sections of the radical left regarding the feasibility of succeeding through the 
parliamentary system. As a result, some of these segments began a campaign of 
violence against the American military presence and personnel. They started 
attacking U.S. military installations. In 1969, the car of U.S. Ambassador Robert 
Komer was burnt on the charge that he was a ‘‘CIA’’ agent involved in a 
‘‘conspiracy to split the left.’’212 In December 1970 and March 1971, several 
American military personnel were kidnapped and briefly held.  
These ‘‘spectacular terrorist incidents’’213 ‘‘provided the final impetus to 
the generals’’ who were displeased with the ‘‘deterioration of law and order in 
Turkey.’’214 On March 12, 1971, they compelled the Demirel government to resign 
with a ‘‘coup by memorandum’’ thinking that a new government controlled by 
them would be able to end widespread political terrorism and solve the mounting 
social and economic problems.215 For the next two and a half years, they 
controlled the ‘‘above-party’’ governments. Martial law and a massive crackdown 
on the left followed. ‘‘These moves, though designed in the first instance to 
                                                          
210 Mehmet Gönlübol, NATO and Turkey, pp. 27-28. 
211 The TLP received only %2.7 of the votes in the 1969 and with the changes in the electoral law, 
the number of TLP deputies in the Turkish Parliament had fallen from 15 in the 1965 elections to 3 
in 1969. 
212 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 
1945-1971, p.139. 
213 George S. Harris, Cross-alliance Politics: Turkey and the Soviet Union, p. 30. 
214 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 
1945-1971. 
215 Nur Bilge Criss (2000:1) maintains that, like the previous 1960 coup, the 1971 coup was ‘‘made 
for domestic reasons and not because of Turkey’s foreign policy choices and Turkish foreign policy 
remained essentially Western-oriented’’: Nur Bilge Criss, Turkish Foreign Policy and the West, 
p.1. 
 61
combat anarchy and terrorism, nonetheless served effectively to silence many of 
America’s most virulent critics.’’216 
 
3.4. Problems of development assistance and military aid 
 
 Following the military intervention of 1960, an era of planned development 
started in Turkey. This new economic policy coupled with the rising balance of 
payments deficit accentuated Turkey’s need to find foreign economic financing. 
Meanwhile, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, ‘‘the severe and growing 
balance of payments problems had led Washington to begin to shift’’ its general 
aid policy increasingly ‘‘from grant aid to loans’’ and to try to involve its 
European allies in sharing the burden of assistance to’’ less developed ‘‘countries 
like Turkey.’’217 Following negotiations to this end, a consortium of 14 Western 
countries for aid to Turkey was established in 1962, in which the U.S. was the 
main donor. Meanwhile, ‘‘the intensity of the Cold War was visibly receding and 
with it went some of the urgency in providing both economic and military 
assistance to Turkey.’’218 219 Consequently, Turkey now had less  bargaining 
power for aid and U.S. assistance to Turkey would be ‘‘annually reduced by 
Congress’’, which was reluctant to fund foreign aid (despite the opposition of the 
U.S. executive).220 As the American contribution to the Consortium for Aid to 
Turkey fell considerably, the European members of the consortium increased their 
contribution to a certain extent. Nonetheless, the total assistance given by the 
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consortium declined significantly from $269 million in 1967 to $165 million in 
1968.221 Due to declining American (and Western) aid, Turkey was forced to seek 
other sources of assistance and started to meet its need for external financing from 
the IMF and the European Monetary Agency and improving economic relations 
with the Soviet Union. 
Another thorny issue in the economic realm of the relations were the 
strings attached to U.S. economic aid. The Americans wanted the Turks to put 
more emphasis on private sector initiatives and market forces and wanted 
development assistance to be spent in an economically rational way, for more 
feasible projects, rather than (what they deemed) in a populist manner. Moreover, 
‘‘following the stabilization program of 1958, the U.S. came to devote a higher 
proportion of its assistance to support for specific projects and less to underwriting 
a share of the Turkey’s balance of payments deficit,’’222 leading to Turkish 
protests of interference in their internal affairs. Further, American diplomacy in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s ‘‘used economic and military aid as a weapon to 
compel Turkey to ban poppy cultivation,’’ causing resentment in Turkey.223 
After having reached a peak in the early 1960s, American military aid 
levels started to decrease as of 1963. Throughout the 1960s, there was a big 
difference between the amount of military aid that Turkey expected from the U.S. 
and the American aid that it actually received. The Turks continuously voiced their 
dissatisfaction that that the Americans were not meeting a sufficient proportion of 
Turkey’s military burden within the context of the Atlantic Alliance. 
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3.5. Bilateral agreements  
 Between 1947 and 1966, fifty-five bilateral agreements regulating the 
American military presence in Turkey had been signed between the U.S. and 
Turkey. Some were verbal and some were on paper. Some of these agreements 
were open, while some were secret. ‘‘Following the 1964 Cyprus crisis and under 
the impact of rising anti-American sentiment, the opposition parties demanded the 
publication, cancellation or revision of the bilateral agreements, which they 
believed compromised Turkish sovereignty’’.224 Moreover, the Turkish military 
and the Turkish government wanted to exercise more control over the joint 
installations and over the status of the American personnel and aimed to prevent 
abuse of some of the privileges contained in these accords. Consequently, 
following a proposal by Turkey, ‘‘Turkish-American negotiations for the revision 
of the bilateral agreements began in March 1966 and it was agreed between the 
two parties that the provisions concerning the stationing of American forces would 
be combined into a ‘‘basic’’ agreement.’’225 
 Following extensive negotiations, the Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA) between the two sides was signed on July, 3- 1969. ‘‘This agreement, 
which replaced the Military Facilities Agreement of 1954, revised some of the 
bilateral arrangements and attempted to clarify others.’’226 It based Turkish-
American defense cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty 
and equality of the two parties. In order to prevent future fait accomplis, it was 
foreseen that the joint military installations in Turkey and the way they were used 
had to have the approval of the Turkish government. Turkish authorities could 
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inspect the installations, which were to be jointly managed and used. American 
military and civilian personnel had to obey Turkish laws and the Turkish 
government would allow U.S. forces to engage in any activity only after obtaining 
full information about the nature of these activities. The property rights of the 
areas, where joint defense installations were set up, belonged to Turkey.227  
 Vali (1971: 141) points out that ‘‘the implementation of this consolidated 
basic agreement, while hardly satisfactory to the radical left, was more acceptable 
to the moderates and removed the principal reason for the anxiety which grew 
from the surrender of Turkish sovereignty to the United States.’’228   
 
3.6. The 1967 Cyprus crisis 
On November 15, 1967, tensions in Cyprus rose again when the Cypriot 
National Guard, led by Greek officers from the mainland launched an attack on a 
Turkish enclave. The attack led to nation-wide demonstrations in Turkey and 
strong public pressure on the Turkish government to conduct a military 
intervention in order to protect the Turkish community on the island. 
Consequently, Turkey started preparations for a landing and it notified the U.S. 
(and the Soviet Union) that it would take action to solve the problem. President 
Johnson responded by proposing to solve the conflict through negotiations and 
sent his special envoy, former U.S. Undersecretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance to 
mediate a solution.229  
                                                          
227 This paragraph is based upon  George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems 
in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971, pp. 229-238, Fahir Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan 
Münasebetleri, pp. 277-285 and Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus, pp. 140-141. 
228 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus, p.141. 
229 Like the 1964 crisis, Turkey lacked the necessary military equipment, nor were its soldiers 
trained for a landing opeation. Therefore, the American proposal of mediation was again welcomed 
by Turkish government. 
 65
During Mr. Vance’s mediation efforts, Turkey demanded the permanent 
removal of all infiltrated mainland Greek forces in Cyprus, the re-implementation 
of the 1959-1960 Zurich-London Agreements and the lifting of the blockade on 
Cypriot Turks as conditions to cancel its intervention on the island. The Greek 
junta, which needed American support, had to make concessions. Most of the 
Greek troops stationed in Cyprus since 1964 were withdrawn; the Turkish 
Cypriots were allowed to establish their own administration and the Greek Cypriot 
blockade on them were lifted. 
The 1967 crisis was solved in a way satisfactory to Turkey. But 
nevertheless, the problems between the communities in Cyprus remained. This 
time, ‘‘conscious of the adverse effects of the Johnson letter, U.S. diplomacy was 
more careful.’’230 ‘‘Cyrus Vance had accomplished his task of averting a Turkish 
landing and hence preventing the outbreak of Turkish-Greek hostilities and he 
negotiated a settlement of the dispute to the satisfaction of the Turkish government 
without creating false impressions and resentment’’231 in that, ‘‘in Turkish eyes, 
this solution helped to salve the wounds of the past, for the U.S. in this instance 
was not seen as having acted inconsistently with the alliance.’’232 
The 1967 crisis constituted an important turning point in Cyprus. It showed 
to Archbishop Makarios that trying to push for enosis despite Turkey’s opposition 
was unrealistic and this realization forced him to reverse his intransigent policy 
and led him to start favoring some sort of a compromise for the solution of the 
conflict. In 1968, the remaining restrictions on the Turkish community in Cyprus 
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were lifted and in the same year, inter-communal negotiations between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots began. 
 
3.7. The opium controversy 
 
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, drug addiction and the concomitant 
increase in the number of crimes had begun to emerge as a grave problem in the 
United States. The Nixon Administration was extremely concerned by this 
situation so much so that it proclaimed drug abuse as the United States’ public 
enemy number 1 and embarked on an all-out attack on the threat. Meanwhile, 
‘‘American authorities were convinced that a major proportion (some 80 percent 
was the common estimate) of the heroin illegally introduced into the United 
States’’ was produced using opium poppy ‘‘diverted from legal challenges in 
Turkey.’’233 This led the U.S. to pressure Turkey to solve the problem by ending 
poppy harvesting on its soil. Most Americans felt that, ‘‘after having given Turkey 
$5 billion in aid over the years with the flow of money still moving at the rate of 
$200 million a year, Turkey ‘‘owed the United States one’’.234 Moreover, they 
believed that ‘‘Turkey’s legal income from opium production was small.’’235 
 The Turkish view of the situation was quite different. ‘‘The opium 
poppy’’, which was used in the production of legal pain-killing drugs, ‘‘was the 
main cash crop in the Afyon region.’’236 Moreover, the Turks held that the 
American allegation that, 80 percent of the heroin in the U.S. was produced by 
using Turkish opium poppy, was simply not true. According to a report prepared 
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by the Turkish Gendarmerie General Commandership, ‘‘the entire opium produced 
by Turkey in a year would suffice the drug addicts in the U.S. for only twenty-four 
days.’’237 The Turks believed that even if Turkey ended cultivation of the opium 
poppy altogether, illegal drug traffickers would find ample sources elsewhere. 
‘‘They felt that the United States was singling out Turkey’’238 ‘‘by not putting the 
same kind of pressure on its allies in Southeast Asia.’’239 
 Nevertheless, due to constant American pressure as well as the ‘‘threats of 
economic and military sanctions such as the introduction of a trade embargo, a ban 
on weapons sales and the suspension of trade’’240 if it did not eradicate poppy 
cultivation, Turkey cooperated with American and UN narcotic agents, it 
significantly improved its controls and law enforcement mechanisms, it increased 
the government purchasing price for opium and the number of provinces, where 
cultivation was allowed, was progressively reduced from thirty in 1961 to four by 
March, 1971.241 But, despite these Turkish measures, American pressures on 
Turkey to totally ban cultivation continued as they believed that Turkey was not 
doing its best to prevent leakage of opium poppies into illegal channels. ‘‘In 
retaliation’’ to Turkey’s refusal to ban poppy cultivation altogether, ‘‘economic 
aid from the U.S. to Turkey decreased considerably, and credits were curtailed.’’ 
‘‘Turkey became the only ally of the U.S. to have lost its most favored nation 
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status.’’242 But, due to the political importance of the ‘‘75.000 farm families, 
which produced poppy,’’243 it was very difficult, if not impossible for an elected 
government to ban cultivation completely despite continuous American pressures 
to do so.  
Meanwhile, on March 12, 1971, the Turkish Armed Forces coerced the 
Demirel government to resign due to rising political terrorism and unrest. The 
generals wanted a new government to be formed in order to amend the constitution 
and the laws so as to more effectively fight terrorism and put an end to domestic 
unrest. Accordingly, a new government was formed under the leadership of Nihat 
Erim. 
Erim needed international and especially American support for his weak 
government and that led him to bow to American demands. Moreover, unlike the 
previous, civilian government, the technocratic, non-party government of Nihat 
Erim, did not have an electorate, to which it was responsible, and this facilitated 
the decision to eradicate poppy cultivation. Hence, soon after assuming office, he 
declared a total ban on poppy cultivation. In return, the U.S. undertook to extend 
to Turkey $35 million to compensate the farmers and facilitate the switch to other 
crops. 
 This decision was welcomed in the United States, but was very unpopular 
and ‘‘contributed to anti-Americanism and to a decrease in American prestige.’’244 
The United States was criticized by the Turkish public and in the Turkish 
Parliament for pressuring Turkey to end cultivation. The Turks believed that the 
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ban would not stop the drug abuse problem in the United States since illegal drug 
traffickers would easily find suppliers of opium elsewhere. But due to the political 
conditions of the time (March 1971- October 1973), the Turkish Parliament could 
not oppose governmental policies, so the ban remained. 
 The first elections after the military intervention were scheduled for 
October, 1973. All political parties promised to lift the ban on poppy production in 
their electoral campaigns. According to Ahmad (1977: 419), ‘‘the question was 
not merely viewed as a matter of restoring the cultivators’ right to grow opium 
poppies, but of regaining Turkey’s right to exercise autonomy and restoring its 
independence, dignity and prestige.’’245 Hence, soon after taking office, the new 
coalition government of the RPP, led by Bülent Ecevit and the National Salvation 
Party (NSP), declared that it would consider lifting the ban. Meanwhile, ‘‘the U.S. 
seemed to be encouraging India to expand its production’’ of opium and 
contemplated starting cultivation of opium poppies itself246 (in order to overcome 
the shortage of opium used in the production of legal pain-killing drugs, which 
was partly caused by the Turkish ban). Moreover, the drug abuse problem in the 
U.S. could not be reduced despite the Turkish ban.  Therefore, despite American 
pressure to maintain the ban and ‘‘warnings that U.S.-Turkish relations would 
worsen’’ if the ban was lifted,247 Prime Minister Ecevit announced at the end of 
June 1974 that the ban would be repealed.248  
On 30 June 1974, the United States Executive reacted by calling back its 
ambassador to Ankara, William Macomber, for consultations in Washington. The 
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U.S. Congress passed resolutions, whereby the President was advised to start 
negotiations with his Turkish counterpart in order to prevent the resumption of 
cultivation and if that failed, end American aid to Turkey. ‘‘The President, 
however, confined his actions to the suspension of aid that was being given as part 
of the 1971 ban package.’’249 Soon after, an arms embargo was imposed on 
Turkey following its military operations in Cyprus. ‘‘The idea of punitive action as 
a result of the repeal of the ban had provided the psychological and legislative 
groundwork and had already promoted an utterly negative and preconditioned 
attitude towards Turkey in the American Congress, media and public.’’250  
In late 1974 and early 1975, the U.S. Congress passed more resolutions 
advising the President to pressure the Turks to reinstitute the ban. ‘‘These 
recommendations did not produce any action’’ by the U.S. Executive ‘‘in the 
direction the Congress recommended’’ since the American government believed 
that ‘‘the measures that Turkey had taken’’ to prevent leakage of opium poppies 
into illegal channels had been effective.251 Thereafter, the opium poppy ceased to 
be an issue of controversy in Turkish-American relations.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS BETWEEN 1974-1980 
 
 
 
 
4.1. The 1974 coup in Cyprus and its aftermath 
As indicated above, from March 1971 to October 1973, Turkey was ruled 
by above-party, technocratic governments that acted in accordance with the armed 
forces’ requests, while the Turkish military tried to solve the problem of domestic 
terrorism and the threat of wide-scale internal unrest by curtailing civil rights252 
and embarking on a crackdown against the left.  
Civilian politics resumed in October 1973 with two new-comers in the 
political arena. The new leader of the RPP, Bülent Ecevit supported the idea of a 
‘‘more independent foreign policy within NATO’’253 and believed that Turkey 
‘‘could afford to adopt an assertive foreign policy in contrast to İnönü’s policies of 
caution vis-a-vis the superpowers’’.254 The National Salvation Party (NSP), led by 
Necmettin Erbakan had an anti-Western foreign policy. A coalition government of 
the RPP and the NSP was formed in January 1974. 
In Cyprus, American diplomatic efforts regarding the Cyprus issue had 
ended following the start in 1968 of inter-communal negotiations. The Cyprus 
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inter-communal negotiations did not bear any fruits due to the wide disparity 
between the views of the two parties. Meanwhile, Greece had taken control of the 
Greek Cypriot security forces and it had turned them into an organization that paid 
allegiance to the Athens colonels’ junta in Greece, rather than to the government 
of Makarios, who was ‘‘becoming disenchanted with the Greek military 
government and more interested in maintaining the status quo than in continuing 
the drive for enosis’’,255 to the chagrin of the colonels.  
In November 1973, Colonel Demetrios Ioannides, who detested Makarios 
due to the Archbishop’s cordial relations with local and international communists 
and the non-aligned movement, and determined to realizing enosis, overthrew 
Colonel George Papadopoulos and became the new leader of the Greek junta. 
Soon after, ‘‘the ‘new’ junta took over full control of the Greek Cypriot National 
Guard and EOKA-B, the extremist successor of EOKA’’256, prompting a harsh 
reaction from Makarios, who on July 6, 1974, made public a letter that he had sent 
to the junta accusing it of political murders and conspiracies, including several 
foiled coup attempts, and ‘‘demanding the immediate withdrawal of mainland 
Greek officers in the National Guard’’257 because they were trying to overthrow 
his government. The Greek junta responded to the letter with a coup on 15 July, 
which overthrew Makarios and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, who had the 
reputation of hating Turks.258  
‘‘The Cyprus crisis presented a serious diplomatic challenge to the U.S. at 
a time when President Richard Nixon was pre-occupied with the Watergate 
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affair’’259 and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the Middle East peace 
process. Following the coup in Cyprus, ‘‘the picture as seen from Washington was 
described by International Herald Tribune journalist James Reston in the following 
words’’:  
        The immediate concern of the U.S. Government in the Cyprus crisis is 
        to avoid open warfare between two of its NATO allies, Greece and  
        Turkey, but beyond that it is faced with an extremely awkward set of  
        political and strategic problems. First, Washington deplores the 
        authoritarian military government in Athens, but is dependent on  
        bases in Greece. …Second, while Washington sympathizes with the plight  
        of President Makarios of Cyprus, he had tended to turn for help to  
        Moscow when in trouble, and the one thing the U.S. wants to avoid 
        other than losing base privileges in Greece, is to have Soviet forces 
        based on Cyprus.260 
 
‘‘Washington was taken by surprise when the coup d’etat against Makarios 
was reported. There had, however, been many warning signs in intelligence reports 
over the previous five months’’.261 Most notably, on June 3, 1974, Ioannides had 
told to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official that, ‘‘Greece was 
capable of removing Makarios and his key supporters from power with little if any 
blood shed.’’ ‘‘If Makarios continued to ‘provoke’ Athens, Ioannides said he 
would have to consider whether to remove him once and for all.’’262 Once the 
United States Government was made aware of this plot, it asked its Ambassador in 
Athens, Henry Tasca to personally discuss the issue with Ioannides. ‘‘However, 
Ambassador Tasca chose only to send an aide to see Ioannides’’. According to 
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Taşhan, ‘‘it is not clear whether Mr. Tasca really made an attempt to dissuade 
Ioannides from embarking on this plot’’.263 264 
In July 16, the day after the coup, Turkish policy-makers began to discuss 
the situation in Cyprus. They all believed that only a military operation could 
prevent a Greek fait accompli and it was decided to start military preparations for a 
landing. If Turkey did not take action, it would be unable to prevent the realization 
of enosis and Turkish Cypriots would face dire consequences. Before the military 
operation, Ecevit would consult with only one of the other two guarantor powers 
of Cyprus, that is, the United Kingdom for a joint intervention (since Greece, the 
other guarantor power of Cyprus, had carried out the coup) and if the British were 
against a joint intervention, Turkey would act alone.265 Accordingly, Turkish 
forces would first try to capture a bridgehead in northern Cyprus, which would be 
followed by talks for a new constitution during which Turkey would have the 
chance to negotiate from a position of strength. If the Greeks refused this, then the 
second stage of the operation would be given the go-ahead, whereby Turkish 
military forces would try to gain territory big enough to host and secure the 
protection of Turkish Cypriots.266  
 On 17 July, Ecevit flew to London for consultations with the British 
government. However, the British were against a joint intervention.267 Meanwhile, 
when it was realized that Turkey was intent on taking action, Kissinger sent his 
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Under-Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco to London ‘‘in order to attempt mediation 
that could delay the Turkish intervention’’268, but Ecevit did not want Sisco to join 
the British-Turkish negotiations since the U.S. was not a guarantor power of 
Cyprus. So, the meeting of Ecevit and Sisco took place later, in 18 July. ‘‘As 
Ecevit expected, Sisco tried to stop the Turkish military intervention by a 
combination of rewards and threats’’.269 The United States would increase its 
military assistance to Turkey that had been decreased due to the opium conflict; a 
military intervention would mean the end of American aid and a military operation 
by Turkey would prompt a Turkish-Greek war, which would in turn have serious 
repercussions on Turkish-American relations. Ecevit did not yield and put forward 
several conditions to cancel Turkey’s military intervention: ‘‘the Greek officers 
who had conducted the coup should be withdrawn from the island’’; Turkey 
should be able to send a sizable armed force to Cyprus and ‘‘Turkish Cypriots 
should be given control of a coastal region in the north and negotiations for the 
creation of a federal system should start’’.270 Sisco then notified the Athens junta 
of Turkish demands who duly refused them. ‘‘He then went to Ankara to tell 
Ecevit about the Greek reply’’. Ecevit did not budge. ‘‘Sisco once more flew to 
Athens, but again came back empty-handed, save a Greek willingness to withdraw 
the officers that had taken part in the coup’’.271  
Meanwhile, Kissinger engaged in ‘‘phone diplomacy’’ in order to convince 
Ecevit to call off the intervention. Ecevit asked Kissinger that ‘‘the U.S. should not 
apply the same type of pressure as it had in 1964, which he indicated, might lead 
                                                          
268 Süha Bölükbaşı, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and 
Cyprus, pp. 191-192. 
269 İlter Turan, The United States and Turkey: Limiting Uniletaralism, p. 15. 
270 Süha Bölükbaşı, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and 
Cyprus, p. 192. 
271 İlter Turan, The United States and Turkey: Limiting Uniletaralism, p. 16. 
 76
to the permanent rupture in Turkey’s relationship with the Western alliance.’’272 
Thus, neither the Greeks nor the Turks could be persuaded and Turkey embarked 
on its military operation on 20 July.  
Before going into Turkey’s military intervention and the subsequent 
developments, the most important factors which affected Ecevit’s determination to 
engage his country in a landing operation should be examined: First, the Sampson 
coup did not prompt a strong reaction on the part of the U.S. executive branch. 
‘‘Deploying a detached attitude’’, State Department spokesman Robert Anderson 
maintained that ‘‘in our view, there has not been outside intervention in 
Cyprus’’273 and refused to condemn the Greek junta.274 275 This gave Ecevit the 
impression that if Turkey did not act quickly, it would be unable to prevent a 
Greek fait accompli i.e. enosis. Second, the unpopularity of the Greek junta in the 
eyes of world public opinion made international conditions conducive to a Turkish 
operation. Third, Ecevit believed that ‘‘U.S. omnipotence belonged to the early 
Cold War years’’ (when ethnic conflicts were subordinated to Cold War politics), 
‘‘and that smaller allies of the U.S. could therefore ignore American preferences, 
creating fait accomplis with reasonable prospects for a favorable outcome’’.276 
Another major factor that contributed to Ecevit’s assertiveness was the implicit 
Soviet support for a Turkish intervention. ‘‘The Soviet leadership knew that the 
Sampson coup would not only eliminate Cypriot non-alignment, but that enosis, 
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which they believed would follow shortly, would bring Cyprus under the firm 
control of Greece, thus NATO’’.277 And last but not least, unlike the1964 and 1967 
crises, Turkey now had the necessary military equipment and planning to carry out 
a successful landing on Cyprus. 
Consequently, the landing went ahead in 20 July. By the time a cease-fire 
was established through Resolution 353 of the UN Security Council in 22 July, 
Turkish forces had taken control of a territory constituting only 7 percent of the 
island’s geographical area and less than what had been foreseen in the military 
plans, which left % 65 of Turkish Cypriots outside of Turkish protection.278 But 
nevertheless, Turkey notified the parties concerned that it was ready to start 
negotiations.279 
The Greek colonels’ regime had not foreseen such a development and 
could not mobilize the Greek army, and as a result of the ensuing fiasco, the junta 
was ousted and was replaced by a civilian government on 23 July. Simultaneously, 
Sampson had to resign and the moderate Glafkos Clerides was made the head of a 
provisional government in Cyprus. 
In 25 July, the negotiations for peace talks started between Turkey, Greece 
and Britain (with the super powers as observers) began in Geneva. ‘‘By 29 July, 
they reached a deadlock’’, but at that point Kissinger intervened and succeeded in 
convincing Ecevit that ‘‘acceptance of the UN Resolution did not mean that 
Turkey would have to withdraw its forces immediately, and the parties signed a 
joint declaration the following day’’, which made the withdrawal of Turkish forces 
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conditional on ‘‘the achievement of a ‘‘just and lasting solution acceptable to all 
parties concerned’’.280 Hence, Greece and Britain had ‘‘recognized Turkey’s 
military presence in Cyprus and acknowledged the legitimacy of its right to 
occupy a part of Cyprus till a new Constitution was elaborated’’.281 
The British, Greek and Turkish delegations met again in Geneva in 9 
August, in order to engage in negotiations to produce a new constitution. 
However, the Greek Cypriot and the Greek side were no longer interested in 
finding a solution to the conflict because: ‘‘Klerides actually believed that time 
was on the Greeks’ side and if the negotiations lasted long enough, international 
pressure on Turkey would make it increasingly difficult for Turkey to pursue a 
policy of blackmail’’ and the conditions that existed before the coup would 
eventually be restored.282 Therefore, the Greek side employed a very intransigent 
attitude during the negotiations, rejecting Turkish offers and ‘‘ignoring British and 
American recommendations of a federal state and their threats that they might not 
be able to prevent Turkey from conducting a second operation.’’283 Nevertheless, 
‘‘under American pressure, the Ankara government agreed to the ‘cantonal plan’, 
under which the Turkish Cypriots would be given six separate cantons within a 
federal structure’’.284 When the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, presented 
this plan to him on 13 August, Clerides asked for a 36-hour recess to examine the 
Turkish proposals. This was perceived by Güneş as an excuse to gain time by the 
Greeks and Greek Cypriots for the reasons indicated above and was therefore 
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refused by him. Moreover, the 40,000 Turkish troops on the island were in a 
precarious situation as they were stuck in a small area making them very 
vulnerable to attack and the Greek Cypriot National Guard was still in occupation 
of isolated Turkish enclaves on other parts of the island.285 Further, Turkey wanted 
to take control of a bigger piece of land, which could be used as a leverage in 
future negotiations and if it didn’t move for a second time, it could be resigned to 
suffice itself with the 7 percent of the island it currently held. Thus, the next day, 
on 14 August, the second Turkish military operation went ahead and Turkish 
forces soon established control over 36 percent of the northern part of the island.  
Neither super power did anything to prevent a second Turkish landing. 
Kissinger286 defended himself against the accusations of the U.S. Congress and the 
Greek lobby regarding his failure to threaten sanctions in order to prevent the 
Turkish landing operations by claiming that the U.S. did not employ threats to 
Turkey for these reasons: First, he believed that such an action would not succeed 
in averting a Turkish intervention because Kissinger knew that ‘‘he was dealing 
with a Turkish Government that, unlike its predecessors, considered assertiveness 
a virtue in itself’’.287 In any case, American aid to Turkey had decreased to a ‘‘bare 
minimum due to budgetary reasons and also possibly because of Congress’ 
attitude on the poppy question’’. ‘‘So, this was not a sufficient weapon to stop 
Turkish action’’.288 Second, Kissinger maintained that ‘‘the U.S. was giving 
economic and military aid as a reflection of its common interest in the defense of 
the Eastern Mediterranean and not as a favor to Turkey.’’ Short of that embargo 
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threat, however, ‘‘they had made the most repeated and urgent representations to 
Turkey in order to prevent a military action.’’289 Third, Kissinger thought that the 
approach most likely to succeed in dissuading Turkey’s landings was to 
‘‘continuously assure the Turks that the U.S. considered their demands legitimate 
and that negotiations would sooner or later bring favorable results’’.290 Fourth, 
Kissinger did not want to use the U.S. 6th Fleet ‘‘to discourage or coerce Turkey’’ 
because ‘‘the Turkish mood was’’, as was stated earlier, ‘‘beyond being affected 
by mere threats’’. Hence, when ‘‘Henry Tasca suggested that the 6th Fleet should 
be deployed near Cyprus to indicate American dissatisfaction with Turkey’s 
expected military operation, Kissinger refused to comply’’.291 Fifth, preventing 
Turkey from saving Turkish Cypriots from massacre at the hands of Greek 
Cypriots for the second time in 10 years would shock the Turks, causing 
tremendous harm to Turkish-American relations. Moreover, as Kissinger asserts, 
‘‘in 1964 and 1967, the U.S. had been preeminent. In 1974 however, with Nixon 
on the verge of either resignation or impeachment, the U.S. was in a weak position 
to threaten or cajole’’.292 Therefore, ‘‘in the absence of other leverages and given 
the situation that President Richard Nixon was in, the U.S. could only work 
through diplomacy’’,293 which Kissinger did by sending Joseph Sisco to the 
London talks and through the Geneva Conference. 
After the second operation, Ecevit thought that the Greeks would return to 
negotiations and Turkey would be able to achieve a favorable solution, thanks to 
its position of strength following the second operation. But the Greek side did not 
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want to resume the negotiations. ‘‘Turkey had enjoyed broad international support 
and sympathy at the time of the first landings because the independence of Cyprus 
was threatened by the Greek junta and the safety of the Turkish community was in 
danger’’.294 Moreover, the international community granted that Turkey had used 
its right within the context of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to reinstitute the 
independence of Cyprus. But Hale (2000: 159) argues that ‘‘it sacrificed this 
support and sympathy by embarking so precipitately on the second operation’’,295 
which was perceived by the international community as expansionism and 
contrary to the stipulations of the Zurich-London Agreements. 
 
4.2. The arms embargo 
 While ending U.S. assistance to Turkey was already being contemplated by 
the American Congress due to Turkey’s repeal of the ban on poppy cultivation, the 
second operation and Turkish use of American military equipment (which was 
seen in some congressional circles as a violation of the U.S. Foreign Assistance 
and Foreign Military Sales Acts) soon became an issue of concern for the 
Congress.  
 
4.2.1. The shaping of American policy after the second Turkish intervention 
 Before going into the discussion of the embargo legislation, the factors and 
motives that were influential in the arms embargo decision and the arguments put 
forth by the congressional supporters and executive opponents of the sanction 
should be examined in order to better comprehend the context in which the 
decision to sanction Turkey was taken: The imposition of the arms embargo on 
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Turkey was partly the product of the Watergate crisis, as a result of which the 
executive branch lost its previous power in foreign policy decision making. 
Consequently, executive policies296 started to lose credibility in the eyes of the 
Congress. In addition to the effects of the Watergate imbroglio, ‘‘Congress was 
already showing signs of disappointment with the Administration’s mishandling of 
American foreign policy and with its policies towards Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile 
and Soviet Union’’297 and ‘‘resented the monopolization of foreign policy 
decisions by the Nixon-Kissinger duo’’.298 According to Campany (1986: 78), 
‘‘these factors and the power vacuum caused by the Watergate scandal led 
Congress to want to ‘’re-assert’’ its role in foreign policy decision making ‘‘after 
three decades of executive dominance and congressional subordination in foreign 
policy making to the extent that any infringement of the executive on 
congressional authority was the target of a strong reaction’’.299 Within this context, 
Kissinger’s attempt to ‘‘downplay the legal aspects of the Turkish situation, and 
his attempts to convince Congress that the Administration was in the best position 
to evaluate U.S. national interest in the Cyprus crisis, backfired’’.300  
According to Süha Bölükbaşı: 
        Another reason for the effectiveness of the pro-embargo effort was the 
        fact that the party system in American politics had lost its former 
        power. Interest groups such as the Greek lobby now gained easy access 
        to individual Congressmen. Further, the intense activism of the Greek lobby  
        in the U.S. to have an arms ban imposed on Turkey also strengthened the  
        hands of those Congressmen, who were promoting the embargo and  
        convinced some other Congressmen to join the embargo bandwagon.301  
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In this context,302 the Greek Orthodox Church of Northern America was 
instrumental in arousing Greek-Americans. The most important Greek-American 
civil societal organization in this context was the American Hellenic Educational 
Progressive Association (AHEPA), which prompted Greek Americans to pressure   
Congressmen and Senators by writing letters. Both AHEPA and the American 
Hellenic Institute (AHI), another lobbying organization, hired public relations 
firms, kept ‘‘voting records of Congressmen and Senators’’ and worked hard to 
find support for the Greek cause in the Congress (with the help of Congressmen of 
Greek descent such as John Brademas and Paul Sarbanes and opponents of 
Kissinger’s foreign policy such as Edward Kennedy, Benjamin Rosenthal and 
James Eagleton) the press, the radio and television. ‘‘Before Congressional votes, 
AHEPA and AHI organized massive telephone campaigns to apply additional 
pressure on those who were still undecided’’. Several mass-scale demonstrations 
were staged by Greek Americans in major American cities. According to some 
studies, ‘‘the pressure from Greek Americans affected the votes of many 
Congressmen’’ at a propitious time period for the Greek lobby when the U.S. mid-
term elections were approaching. ‘‘There was an especially significant correlation 
between the size of the Greek American constituency and the way in which some 
House and Senate members voted’’.303  
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Several arguments were effectively used by the Congressional proponents 
of the embargo: First, according to most Senators and Representatives, Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus did not constitute self-defense; it was illegal and ‘‘the 
Administration had ignored the rule of law by continuing its assistance to 
Turkey’’,304 which had used American military equipment for a purpose that they 
deemed as other than internal security or self defense. In that context, the U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 and 
the 1947 Aid to Agreement between Turkey and the United States (which 
prohibited the use of American-supplied weapons for purposes other than defense) 
were mentioned to prove that Turkey, which they believed had engaged in 
aggression, ‘‘should be ineligible for further military assistance because it did not 
use U.S. arms for internal security or legitimate self-defense’’.305  Second, the 
embargo proponents in the Congress suggested that such a foreign policy action 
would coerce Turkey to be more accommodative in Cyprus negotiations towards 
the solution of the problem, thereby facilitate the peace process. For them, not 
cutting off military aid to Turkey would be tantamount to rewarding it for its 
action in Cyprus. Moreover, it would harm the United States’ relations with 
Greece. Third, the arms embargo gave many congressmen who resented Turkey’s 
recent decision to lift the ban on poppy cultivation a good chance to punish 
Turkey. Fourth, there were those Congressmen who argued that ‘‘Turkey was no 
longer important to the geopolitical interests of the United States and thus did not 
deserve assistance’’.306  
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Officials of the U.S. executive branch on the other hand maintained that: 
First, Turkey was a strategically very important ally with respect to its location 
vis-a-vis the Middle East and the Soviet Union and the embargo would mean the 
end of American military and intelligence-gathering activities in Turkey, which 
were very important for monitoring the Soviet Union. Second, the embargo would 
weaken the Turkish armed forces and the defense of NATO’s southern flank 
would suffer. Third, an embargo would fail to coerce Turkey to make concessions 
on Cyprus. On the contrary, it would strengthen Turkish intransigence. 
Consequently, ‘‘the embargo would alienate Turkey without actually satisfying 
Greek concerns over Cyprus’’.307  Fifth, while Turkey’s use of American weapons 
in its military interventions might be a violation of U.S. laws, use of such weapons 
in a similar fashion by other American allies, such as by Israel in Lebanon, had not 
prompted an American reaction and it would be unfair to single out Turkey and 
apply selective punishment. And sixth, ‘‘while the threat of an aid cut off would 
conceivably do some good, it would lose its effectiveness as a leverage once 
imposed’’.308 
 Thus, as can be seen from the above discussion, there was a ‘‘fundamental 
difference in the perception’’ of the U.S. Administration, which ‘‘attached 
primacy to military and strategic interests’’ and ‘‘Congressional circles, which did 
not place the same importance on Turkey’s military and strategic importance as 
the Administration’’ (in a time period when the American public wanted a 
reduction of U.S. commitments abroad), and which sought to selectively uphold 
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the U.S. rule of law and ‘‘to reconcile American interests with their own election 
concerns’’.309  
 
4.2.2. The embargo legislation and Turkey’s reaction 
  The congressional proponents of an embargo were not convinced by the 
arguments of the executive branch against punishing Turkey and would soon move 
to impose a sanction.  On 15 August, 1974, U.S. Congressmen of Greek origin led 
by John Brademas visited the Secretary of State and condemned the failure of the 
Administration to prevent the second Turkish intervention, with Brademas 
claiming that the use of American weapons in Cyprus was a contravention of 
American laws and the fourth article of the Aid to Turkey Agreement of 1947 
between Turkey and the U.S.310, which stipulated that Turkey had to have 
American consent for the use of U.S. military assistance.  Meanwhile, the 
Executive tried to delay congressional action with the State Department 
announcing that it was ‘studying’ the issue on 10 September 1974, while Kissinger 
stated that an investigation would be started by the executive in order to determine 
the source of the weapons used in Turkey’s military interventions and the legality 
of that action, adding that a decision on Turkey would be made afterwards.311 But 
nevertheless, Congress started to work for the imposition of an embargo on Turkey 
without waiting for the results of the executive investigation because it was 
convinced that ‘‘Kissinger’s easygoing approach towards Turkey had caused the 
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Turkish expansionism and therefore, Congress had to take control of the U.S 
policy towards Turkey’’.312 
In response to congressional arguments in support of a ban, the Turks held 
that under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee of Cyprus, Turkey had the 
right to intervene independently (after consultations with the other two guarantor 
powers) ‘‘to preserve the independence of Cyprus’’ and that the ‘‘UN Charter 
allowed for self-defense’’ adding that, ‘‘the threat of extermination facing the 
Turks in Cyprus, created the proper legal justification for self-defense’’.313 
Moreover, ‘‘Greece had used American weapons against Turks, too and yet no 
such reaction was observed in the United States regarding the violation of 
American laws’’314 and the Turks believed that the Cyprus problem and Turkish-
American relations were two separate issues. And like the U.S. Executive, the 
Turks maintained that they were ‘‘extended aid not as a favor, but as part of joint 
defense’’ within the context of the Atlantic Alliance and that imposition of a 
sanction would weaken the southern flank of NATO.315 
Nevertheless, on September 19, a sense of the Senate resolution to impose 
an embargo passed by a vote of 64-27. Five days later, the sense of the Senate was 
followed by sense of the Congress by a vote of 374-26 and became legislation. 
The legislation prohibited any funds (including economic aid) from being used to 
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Kamran İnan, The U.S. Military Embargo: Its Causes and Effects, p. 91. According to Bölükbaşı, 
‘‘the American failure to universally apply  its laws and impose arms embargoes on such states 
proved that the Turkish arms embargo was not the result of a simple compliance with the law, but 
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superpowers and the third world: Turkish-American relations and Cyprus, p. 219. 
315 Çağrı Erhan, ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler, p.707. 
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supply military assistance to Turkey including Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
military credits, grants and guarantees and banned the government-to-government 
or commercial military sales (of weapons (and their spare parts) made or licensed 
by the United States)316 until the President certified to the Congress that 
‘substantial progress toward agreement had been made regarding the Cyprus 
issue.’ The new U.S. President Gerald Ford vetoed this legislation. But despite the 
efforts of Mr. Ford to prevent other embargo legislations from becoming law, the 
efforts by the Congress were renewed and the President realized that a 
compromise had to be reached with the Congress in order to prevent further 
damage on executive-legislative relations.  
Accordingly, Congress passed, on October 17, 1974, the embargo 
legislation (by adding amendment ‘x’ to the 620th section of the 1961 U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Act),317 including equipment worth of $185 million that was already 
paid for by Turkey. ‘‘But, in a bow to Ford’s entreaties, a grace period of four 
months, to February 5, 1975, was granted if substantial progress could be made in 
negotiations’’.318   
After the adoption of the legislation, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit made 
the following points, harbinger of Turkish retaliation:  
        After the adoption of this resolution, any move to be unilaterally taken 
        by us to  facilitate the settlement of the Cyprus problem will be  
        interpreted as being initiated under the threat of Congress resolution. I 
        do not need to explain to you how strong a reaction this might create in 
        the Turkish public opinion with all its negative effects on the image of the  
        United States. Any gestures to be made by Turkey after the adoption of this       
        resolution will be taken by those circles who believe in the use of threat          
        and pressure to solve the Cyprus deadlock as a confirmation of their view. 
        The 10,000 strong Greek National Guard in Cyprus from mainland Greece  
        were armed and equipped with U.S. supplies, and it was going to be most  
                                                          
316 For a list of the embargoed military items, see Appendix A. 
317 For the text of this legislation, see Appendix B. 
318 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 235. 
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        difficult to explain to the Turkish public why U.S. legislation was directed  
        against Turkey alone. This would lead to questioning the nature of collective    
        security and extra effort would be required to justify the presence of  
        common  defense installations within the concept of bilateral cooperation.319 
 
 Nonetheless, Kissinger’s mediation efforts regarding the Cyprus crisis 
continued unabated. Meanwhile, Nur Bilge Criss asserts that, the intransigence in 
negotiations of Greece ‘‘which now relied on exertion of Congressional and UN 
pressure on Turkey, coupled with Ecevit’s coalition partner, Necmettin Erbakan’s 
refusal of’’ making concessions ‘‘towards the Cyprus issue became the main 
causes of Ecevit’s resignation from office’’.320 Other political parties refused 
Ecevit’s call for early elections, knowing that the RPP would almost definitely 
receive enough votes to form a single party government owing to Ecevit’s 
popularity at the time. Hence, Senator Sadi Irmak was appointed as prime minister 
on November 17 by President Fahri Korutürk to form an interim government  that 
would stay in office till the elections took place. The Irmak era ‘‘coincided with 
the congressional activity to impose an embargo on Turkey’’. ‘‘Throughout this 
period’’, the weak Irmak government, unlike the previous Ecevit government, was 
not in a situation to ‘‘take the steps necessary to calm the U.S. Congress’’ during 
the four-month delay of the coming into effect of the embargo,321 so an important 
opportunity for a solution of the Cyprus and embargo crises was missed. 
Nevertheless, U.S. executive efforts to convince Congress to reconsider its action 
and its mediation efforts between the Turks and Greeks continued. In a press 
conference on December 7, 1974, Kissinger underlined that ‘‘U.S. military aid was 
not a favor but part and parcel for the defense of NATO’s southeastern flank, and 
                                                          
319 Nur Bilge Criss, Sanction and Diplomacy, p.7. 
320 Nur Bilge Criss, Sanction and Diplomacy, p.7. 
321 Süha Bölükbaşı, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and 
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that Congressional insistence on cut off, while mediation continued, would thwart 
U.S. leverage and Turkish flexibility in Cyprus negotiations.’’322  
 As February 5 approached, Prime Minister Irmak stated that ‘‘the  
 
suspension of U.S. military aid over the Cyprus issue would compel Turkey to  
 
review its ties with NATO.’’323 President Ford wrote to President Korutürk: 
 
        The deep feeling with which this action is viewed by the Government 
        and people of Turkey is well understood in this country where ties  
        with Turkey are highly valued. It is for this reason that I am confident  
        that corrective action will be taken to remove the cause of our current 
        concern. I urge therefore that Turkey join us in exercising restrain while 
        major efforts are under way to restore military assistance.324 
 
 Two days later, Kissinger ‘‘urged’’ the new Turkish Foreign Minister 
Melih Esenbel ‘‘to explain the administration’s efforts to revoke the bill to 
President Korutürk and other members of the Turkish Government so that from 
your side, insofar as possible, nothing is done to that will make our efforts more 
difficult.’’325 Meanwhile, Korutürk’s reply to Ford reflected the  
        ... deep feeling of general disappointment in Turkey... ‘‘The suspension 
        of military aid can hardly be construed as compatible with the  
        relationship which must exist between countries who, in addition to  
        their membership inm the same Alliance, also maintain close bilateral         
        cooperation for common defense... However, I want to assure you that  
        my Government will try its best so that the relationship between the  
        two countries emerge from the situation created by the action of the  
        Congress with as little damage as possible.’’326 
 
 Thus, when the embargo went into effect on February 5, 1975, the Turkish 
reaction was relatively restrained. Turkey refrained from closing the American 
bases on its soil at that point in order not to hamper the efforts of the Ford 
Administration to have the embargo lifted and sufficed itself with establishing a 
                                                          
322 Robert Siner, ‘‘Aid Cutoff to Turkey Approved by House,’’ International Herald Tribune, 
December 12, 1974 quoted in Nur Bilge Criss, Sanction and Diplomacy, pp. 7-8. 
323 Nur Bilge Criss, Sanction and Diplomacy, p.8. 
324 Nur Bilge Criss, Sanction and Diplomacy, p.8. 
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Turkish Cypriot Federated State on February 13 and announcing that it would not 
participate in the NATO winter exercises of February-March 1975.  Turkish policy 
makers would not take substantial retaliatory measures until they were totally 
convinced that the U.S. Administration could not change the congressional policy 
of support for an arms embargo on Turkey.327  
Meanwhile, Kissinger visited Ankara on March 11, 2005. He asked to his 
Turkish whether it was possible to convince the two communities in Cyprus to 
engage in inter-communal negotiations. ‘‘The Turks said they were amenable but 
without any preconditions’’.328 Irmak reminded Kissinger that the Cyprus conflict 
and Turkish-American relations were two separate issues. Kissinger ‘‘agreed to 
explore an approach to de-link the issues, but this would not happen until 1977 
with President Carter’s diplomacy’’.329  
On May 19, 1975, the U.S. Senate adopted, 41-40, the bill S.846 to end the 
embargo. On 17 June, the Turkish government issued a formal note to the U.S. 
government that unless aid was resumed in 30 days, the status of U.S. forces in 
Turkey would change. But on 24 July, the House defeated the Senate bill S. 846, 
223-206, which would have lifted the embargo. On July 24, Kissinger told Esenbel 
that ‘‘they expected some retaliation from Turkey, but advised that this should not 
be too radical for the sake of future relations.’’330 The next day, Turkey announced 
the suspension of the activities of all U.S. military installations (except for those 
that had a purely NATO function i.e. the İncirlik air base) and placed them under 
full Turkish control. It also placed restrictions on U.S. personnel who worked in 
                                                          
327 But nevertheless, the same day, ‘‘following an emergency meeting of the Turkish National 
Security Council, the acting Prime Minister Irmak warned that, U.S. actions would result in a 
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the installations,331 but they were not asked to leave the country in order to prevent 
a further deterioration of Turkish-American relations, for the U.S. Administration 
was working hard to end the embargo.332 Moreover, the Turks unilaterally 
abrogated the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) because ‘‘the joint 
defense agreements had lost their legal validity.’’ This happened at a time when 
the U.S. wanted to use the intelligence-gathering facilities in Turkey333 to monitor 
whether the U.S.S.R. was acting in accordance with the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks Agreement (SALT I). Criss maintains that: 
        The diplomatic dimension of the closure, however, was to eventually compel 
        the U.S. legislators to see the difference between the Cyprus issue and  
        bilateral relations. Esenbel advised the Foreign Ministry that the time had  
        come to change the legal framework of the joint defense installations, outside  
        the aid linkage.334 
  
The embargo was considered unjust by the Turkish public opinion and all 
political leaders, as well as being heavily criticized in the Turkish press, with the 
radical left claiming that the imposition of this sanction proved yet another time 
the ‘‘unreliability of the United States’’. ‘‘As a result of the reaction’’ of the 
Turkish government and the Turkish public, ‘‘U.S.’’ executive ‘‘efforts to have the 
embargo lifted the embargo were soon renewed’’.335 On 31 July, the Senate 
adopted, 47-46, the bill S.2230 that partially lifted the Turkish arms embargo. The 
partial lifting of the arms embargo permitted (1) the shipment of arms contracted 
for with the U.S. before the embargo went into effect and (2) cash sales of arms on 
the commercial market. ‘‘Direct military grants and government sales and 
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credits336 would continue to be prohibited’’.337 ‘‘The same day, ‘‘Ray J. Madden 
(D-Indiana), the U.S. House of Representatives Chairman of the Rules Committee, 
tackled the bill by not convening the committee to provide the bill rule for debate, 
but was circumvented after the Congressional recess’’.338 With the end of the 
recess, “‘‘bill S.2230 was referred to the House International Relations 
Committee’’ and on October 2, the House voted 237-176, to partially lift the 
embargo. Four days later, Ford signed the bill into law (PL 94-104).  
 
4.2.3. Diplomacy under the arms embargo 
 The Ford Administration opposed the embargo and on many occasions, 
Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger tried vigorously to convince members of Congress and 
prominent members of the Greek lobby that the embargo was not successful in 
coercing Turkey to be more accommodative towards the settlement of the Cyprus 
issue by removing flexibility from both the Greek and Turkish sides in 
negotiations, while at the same time it was damaging U.S. interests, too, by 
weakening the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance. In their efforts to convince 
the Congress to lift the ban, U.S. executive officials occasionally employed 
strategic and military arguments concerning Turkey’s value to the Atlantic 
Alliance. To give but two examples: At a hearing before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on 5 September 1976, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert 
Ellsworth summarized Turkey’s significance as: ‘‘allowing NATO to control the 
Straits, forming a buffer between the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, diverting 
                                                          
336 Government sales were economically much more advantageous than commercial sales: Harp 
Akademileri Komutanlığı, Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını (The Past, Present and 
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Warsaw Pact forces from the central flank, and denying the Soviets overflight 
privileges’’. He also stressed the importance of the bases and facilities that 
enhanced the U.S. strategic position in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean 
and underlined the importance of electronic intelligence facilities ‘‘that allowed 
the U.S. to collect unique and important data on Soviet scientific, technological 
and military activities, and to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT I’’.339 The 
importance of the intelligence collection sites in Turkey was described by the 
former NATO Supreme Commander, General Lemnitzer with the following 
words:  
        There is no area in the world compatible to Turkey as a vital base of  
        intelligence gathering operations against the Warsaw Pact. This serious 
        loss of vital U.S. intelligence for more than three years is extremely 
        damaging to American and NATO interests because these bases when 
        fully operational are capable of providing irreplaceable intelligence 
        coverage.’’340  
 
As time passed, many congressmen who had initially supported the embargo 
decision started to realize that an embargo would fail to change Turkish policy as 
regards the Cyprus conflict and that the sanction against Turkey hurt American 
strategic interests, too. But in the words of Henry Kissinger, ‘‘congressional 
‘discipline’ had so broken down in the post-Watergate era that the embargo was 
not finally lifted until well into the Carter era.’’341 
Meanwhile, following the abrogation by Turkey of the 1969 DCA, talks for 
a new defense cooperation agreement ensued. After a year of negotiations, a new 
Defense Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and the U.S. was signed on 
March 29, 1976. The agreement stipulated the re-opening of some of the military 
facilities. It stipulated that the NATO-cum-U.S. bases in Turkey were in Turkish 
                                                          
339 Quoted in Duygu Sezer, ‘‘Turkey’s Security Policies,’’ Adelphi Papers,  No: 164, (1981),  p.21. 
340 Quoted in Richard C. Campany, Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period, p.57. 
341 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 238. 
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control, but lifted most of the restrictions on U.S. personnel. It also foresaw 
military assistance of $1 billion between 1976-1980, $200 million of it in grants. 
The agreement was to enter into force after the embargo was lifted and subject to 
Congressional approval. But despite administrative efforts, the U.S. Congress 
refused to ratify the agreement because there was insufficient progress in Cyprus 
negotiations. Hence, the 1976 DCA was never put into effect.  
 Following the 1976 U.S. presidential elections, the Republican Ford 
administration was replaced by the Democratic Carter administration. The election 
of Jimmy Carter gave Turks the impression that the new U.S. executive would 
pressure on Ankara regarding the Cyprus issue since Mr. Carter had displayed a 
pro-Greek rhetoric in his election campaign.342 But soon after taking office, Carter 
changed his policy in line with U.S. national interests and after having realized 
that the Cyprus issue was difficult to solve while the troublesome relations with 
Turkey continued.  Therefore, the new administration renewed the previous 
executive efforts to persuade Congress to lift the embargo and started to oppose 
the Congressional policy of making the lifting of the embargo conditional on the 
solution of the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, the American perception of detente 
was changing in the late 1970s. According to the U.S. policy makers, the Soviet 
Union was taking advantage of the thaw in Cold War at the expense of the United 
States by extending its sphere of influence. Moreover, a change in the nuclear 
balance in the Soviets’ favor had increased the importance of conventional forces. 
In addition, Turkey’s steadily growing relations with the Soviets and with anti-
American Arab countries and the accompanying fear on the American side that 
                                                          
342 Faruk Sönmezoğlu, ABD’nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980, p. 110. 
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‘‘the Turks could opt for neutrality’’343 were all alarming developments for 
American foreign policy.  
Therefore, soon after assuming office, Carter ‘‘sent Clark Clifford as his 
personal representative off to the eastern Mediterranean with a well-publicized 
display of concern on a fact-finding mission’’.344 Mr. Clifford recommended a 
course of action similar to the one followed by the previous Ford Administration. 
Moreover, ‘‘a working group and an agenda were formed to consider a possible 
scenario to restore the Turkish-U.S. relationship’’345 and efforts to have the 
embargo lifted were intensified. ‘‘On March 28, 1978, President Carter sent a 
delegation headed by Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to discuss 
with Ecevit a plan that would lift the embargo’’.346 ‘‘On 3 April 1978, the United 
States released a text stating that ‘‘the U.S. and Turkey had agreed to renegotiate 
the DCA signed in 1976, but not ratified’’ by Turkey or the U.S. adding that ‘‘new 
and mutually satisfactory defense cooperation arrangements between Turkey and 
the United States would be negotiated’’ and that the U.S. executive would ask the 
Congress to lift the embargo on Turkey.347  
Following continuous and vigorous U.S. administrative efforts to lift the 
embargo, the Turks replied in kind in April 1978 and ‘‘offered more elaborate 
constitutional proposals and more specific areas for territorial negotiations than  
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ever before in regard to the Cyprus problem’’.348 According to American observer  
George Harris (1985: 195):         
        The executive branch of the United States understood and had some  
        sympathy for the compulsions that had led Turkey to act in Cyprus. But 
        the U.S. Congress was far less willing to accept the reasons put forward 
        by the Turks as to why they had to keep their forces on the island. As  
        a result, it proved a difficult challenge to win over a sufficient number of  
        congressmen to lift the embargo completely and to restore a high level of  
        military assistance to Turkey.349  
 
The attempt by the Carter Administration in early 1978 to convince the 
Congress to extend $50 million in economic aid to Turkey and to sell it $175 
million worth of arms was unsuccessful. ‘‘But the Administration persisted in its 
determination to have the embargo lifted’’350 and was finally able to persuade a 
sufficient number of congressmen to end the embargo in late 1978. On September 
26, 1978, Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was repealed, 
ending the 43-month embargo, with the condition that the President ‘‘give reports 
on progress towards the solution of the Cyprus problem every 60 days.’’ Soon 
after, arms transfers to Turkey resumed and the Turks, on 9 October 1978, allowed 
some American installations to be re-opened under Turkey’s control and on an 
interim (one-year) basis (with some other installations being handed over to the 
Turks) while a new defense cooperation agreement was being negotiated.  
In the meantime, the inter-communal negotiations for a settlement of the 
Cyprus problem under UN auspices had resumed on April 28, 1975, but these talks 
did not produce any tangible results, dragging on endlessly. ‘‘The U.S. was not a 
party to these negotiations, but had an interest in their progress, and from time to 
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time made proposals to both sides in the hope of furthering the talks’’.351 
According to Campany (1986: 61-63):  
        The U.S. positions appeared to have contributed little directly to talks. 
        …they did not materially further the Cyprus negotiations, but they did 
        serve a domestic purpose, however, in that they formed the basis 
        for administration findings that progress was being made and that aid 
        to Turkey should resume.352 
 
 
 
4.2.4. The effects of the embargo 
 Political effects: The arms embargo on Turkey was the first time that the 
U.S. was applying such a measure ‘‘under a special law and to a NATO ally’’.353  
Its main goals were to coerce Turkey to be more flexible in the negotiations to 
settle the Cyprus problem and to punish it for its allegedly illegal intervention in 
Cyprus. The embargo failed to achieve the declared purpose of forcing Turkey to 
be more flexible in Cyprus negotiations. On the contrary, it increased Turkish 
intransigence as Turkey refused to bow to foreign pressure and ‘‘chose to suffer 
the deprivations of the embargo rather than accept the humiliating conditions set 
by Congress, which practically meant the adoption of Greek demands prior to 
negotiations’’.354 355 Successive Turkish governments refrained from taking steps 
that could be seen as concessions made as a result of American pressure. Turkey 
never changed its policy of ‘‘maintaining military forces on the island’’ nor did it 
back down on its preference for a ‘‘bi-zonal’’ federation in Cyprus’’.356 Moreover, 
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the embargo led to the further questioning of the reliability of the American 
commitment to Turkish defense. In the words of Nur Bilge Criss: 
        It changed Turkey’s foreign policy behavior towards assuming a more  
        professional and assertive approach in its relations with the United States 
        as well as …teaching Turkey to be utterly cautious with the U.S.A. …The  
        bilateral relations took on a more professional course towards partnership  
        only when and if the national interests of both parties coincided. …It was 
        a healthy sign unlike in the past, when both sides took each other for                 
        granted.357   
 
The embargo contributed to anti-Americanism in Turkey358 and to questioning of 
NATO membership (though not at the state level)359 and it antagonized some 
segments in Turkey which were friendly to the United States, such as the Turkish 
Armed Forces.  
 Military effects: Due to the embargo, Turkey lost a considerable amount 
of its war-making capability, deterrence capacity and military readiness360 361 and 
the modernization of the Turkish military was halted ‘‘while the bulk of the 
Turkish aircraft and armor entered block obsolescence’’.362 Hence, the embargo’s 
goal of punishing Turkey had succeeded, though by weakening the Western 
alliance, too. As mentioned above, the suspension of the activities of American 
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military installations on Turkish soil had important repercussions for the 
Americans. It seriously limited the United States’ ability to gather intelligence 
about the Soviets, which depended to a significant extent on the data collected by 
the electronic installations in Turkey.363 Thus, ‘‘the signs were that the embargo 
had at least as damaging an effect on U.S. military capabilities as on those of 
Turkey’’.364  
 The U.S. arms embargo also made Turkey realize the extent to which it had 
come to depend on just one country as a source for its military equipment since the 
late 1940s365 and how vulnerable it was to manipulation on this issue. This pushed 
Turkey to diversify its sources for weaponry and seek as much self-sufficiency as 
possible in defense and in the procurement of military material in order to reduce 
the military dependence on the U.S. and withstand threats or actual impositions of 
military embargoes in the future. The Turkish Armed Forces started to 
successfully procure a considerable amount of military spare parts from local 
producers at cheaper prices in short order and started to meet the needs of 
maintenance and repair of military systems from local industries.366 Moreover, the 
efforts that had begun before the embargo to establish a domestic arms industry 
were accelerated in order to reduce the dependency on imported military 
equipment. Several projects were embarked upon by the Foundation for the 
Strengthening of the Ground, Air and Naval Forces to produce certain military 
equipments domestically, but because Turkey in the 1970s lacked the foreign 
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exchange and the industrial and technological bases needed to realize such a 
policy, not much improvement was recorded in that timeframe. But nevertheless, 
Turkey continued its effort in the following years and would start to bear the fruits 
of this policy in the 1980s and 1990s through joint-production schemes with 
foreign, especially American, companies and the import of technological know-
how. 
On a positive note, the embargo made the Turkish military establishment 
realize that a considerable amount of the military spare parts that were till then 
purchased from the U.S. could be procured from local producers for much cheaper 
prices and that the needs of maintenance and repair of military equipments could 
be met to a considerable degree by local industries, thereby helping to alleviate the 
problem of dependence on the U.S. for the purchase of military spare parts and for 
the maintenance and repair of military items.367 Further, following the embargo, a 
national military inventory system was initiated in order to stock a sufficient 
amount of military spare parts so as not to be negatively affected by a shortage of 
spare parts during future embargoes in at least the short and medium terms.368 
Moreover, fund raising campaigns were initiated by the Turkish public to meet 
some of Turkey’s urgent military needs.369  
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ship. The ship that was purchased with the funds that were collected was named ‘‘Gurbet’’: 
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Economic effects: Before the embargo, ‘‘U.S. grant aid had fallen down to 
62 million dollars per year’’.370 Hence, the direct economic effect of the embargo 
wasn’t very substantial. Indirectly, however, because ‘‘almost the entire Turkish 
army was equipped with American-made arms and equipment’’, ‘‘transition from 
U.S.-made arms to West European arms’’ necessitated a substantial degree of 
expenditures and ‘‘could be realized only as a long-term project’’.371 ‘‘Utilization 
and maintenance of’’ Turkey’s U.S.-origin ‘‘weapons required the import of spare 
parts of U.S. origin or license’’372 and as many Western European countries 
produced their weapons under U.S. patents and licenses, the time and the expense 
of acquiring weapons had increased to a great degree.373 Further, with the ban on 
U.S. military assistance, many funds that would otherwise be used to solve 
Turkey’s various social and economic problems had to be spent for purchasing 
military equipment and spare parts. This was an important reason behind Turkey’s 
foreign exchange crisis and mounting foreign debts in the 1970s. 
Other effects: According to  Nur Bilge Criss: 
        the sanction also led to many unforeseen legal and financial burdens. As 
        of February 5, 1975, major military equipment and spare parts were cut off.  
        …Honest John and Nike tactical missile programs as well as training 
        had ceased. Approximately hundred tons of untransported equipment were  
        kept in storage in New York and Galveston Bay harbors. Storage 
        and insurance expenses of these material continued to mount. Since 
        these were considered to be U.S. Defense Department property, the Turks  
        were told that when the embargo would be lifted, there would be a price  
        differential according to current pricing and Turkey would have to bear 
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        the costs. …On February 18, 1974, an agreement had been signed by which  
        the U.S. Lockheed firm would repair the wings of four C-130 aircraft. 
        If Turkey sent these airplanes back to the USA, they would not be returned,  
        and if the planes were not sent until August 26, 1975, Turkey would have to  
        pay $350,000 in damages to the firm. If Turkey abrogated the agreement 
        unilaterally, it would have to pay a $20,000 fine. Tank modernization  
        projects were also stalled. And, there was a lot of difficulty in  
        purchasing U.S.-origin spare parts from elsewhere.374 375  
 
 
 
4.3. An altered alliance relationship and changes in Turkish foreign policy 
 The embargo and the resulting problems in the relations with the United 
States led to further Turkish disillusionment with the United States. As indicated 
above, the embargo raised further questions in the minds of Turkish policy makers 
regarding the reliability of the United States and increased the desire to reduce the 
almost exclusive dependence on the United States. The Turks no longer believed 
that the defense and foreign policy interests of the two countries were identical. 
The embargo also attested to the belief that Turkey had to reduce its dependency 
on the United States in the military, economic and political fields as ‘‘Turkish 
security was seen as being held hostage to the vagaries and peculiarities of U.S. 
domestic politics.376 Consequently, Turkey’s efforts to change its almost 
exclusively pro-Western and uni-dimensional foreign policy and to follow a more 
diversified, flexible and multi-lateral foreign and economic policy and its policy of 
acting more independently within NATO and in its international relations, which it 
had embarked upon in the mid-1960s, gained further momentum. Turkey’s 
economic relations with the non-Western world steadily improved.  
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As in the post-1964 developments, it would be an oversimplification to 
claim that the changes in Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s was caused only by 
the Cyprus conflict of 1974 and the subsequent American arms embargo on 
Turkey. In addition to the arms embargo, there were other major factors involved 
in the erosion of alliance cohesion and in Turkey’s adoption of a different foreign 
policy: (1) The detente process decreased Turkey’s threat perception of the 
U.S.S.R. and it provided smaller allies within the two blocs with ‘‘relative 
autonomy’’ in foreign policy.377  Consequently, smaller allies did not have to 
follow the policies and suggestions of the superpowers on every single foreign 
policy issue. (2) As a result of the increasing pluralism in Turkish politics in the 
1960s, foreign policy had become a very popular issue among the Turkish people 
at large and this pluralism made possible the realization that Turkish ‘‘security 
interests do not always converge with other allied interests’’.378 (3) Turkey’s need 
for foreign financing and economic aid had increased as a result of the economic 
crises in the 1970s and due to decreasing Western aid, which underlined the need 
to forge closer economic relations with the non-Western world. (4) As a result of 
the domestic changes in the United States following the Watergate crisis and the 
developments in Vietnam, the U.S. Congress (which was more interested in 
parochial concerns rather than strategic national interests)379 had come to play a 
bigger role in foreign affairs in the 1970s.  Consequently, domestic political 
factors such as the ability of ethnic lobbies to affect foreign policy decision 
making processes, had increased and the U.S. executive branch (with which 
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Turkey’s relations were much more cordial) no longer had the freedom of action in 
the conduct of foreign policy, that it did before 1974. A good example of this 
development was the ability of the ‘‘Greek lobby’’ to maintain the arms embargo 
against Turkey for more than three years despite the fact that the ban hurt 
American national interests, too.380 Under such circumstances, ‘‘it was 
uncomfortable for’’ Turkey ‘‘to feel that its security was in the hands of an 
unpredictable superpower381 and this underlined the need to reduce the 
dependency on the United States. 
Prime Minister Ecevit’s personal conviction was an important factor, too. 
In his view, ‘‘the nature of Turkish-American relations had changed and a new 
reality had to be defined.’’382 He believed that Turkey had to adopt a new 
‘‘National Security Concept’’.383 He did not believe that it would be beneficial for 
Turkey to withdraw from NATO. Ecevit still believed in the ultimate merits of 
Turkish membership of the Atlantic Alliance. However, he argued that ‘‘Turkey 
was over-dependent on the United States and that its contribution to NATO should 
be commensurate with NATO’s contribution to Turkish security.’’384 At the same 
time, Ecevit believed that ‘‘Turkey’s contribution to NATO should not constitute a 
serious risk for Turkey by rendering it provocative in its region’’.385 Hence, 
Turkey would decrease the number of troops it committed to the NATO’s joint, 
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integrated forces386 and further try to improve its relations with regional states. 
Turkey would also accelerate its efforts to develop a domestic arms industry, to 
increase the number of its sources for military equipment and push for further 
changes in its bilateral military relationship with the Americans in order to put 
Turkish-U.S. relations on a more equal footing.  
One good example of these efforts was seen in 1979, when Turkey (in 
response to an American demand) told the United States that it would allow 
American U-2 planes to embark on reconnaissance flights to monitor Soviet 
observation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Agreement II (SALT II) when  
and only if the U.S.S.R agreed, too. As expected, the Soviets rejected, so Turkey 
did not allow the U.S. to use bases in Turkey for such flights. Another was 
witnessed when Turkey deployed a cold-aloof approach to hosting the Rapid 
Deployment Force on its soil.387  
Having said these, there were limits to how much this new foreign policy 
was and could be pushed. The long-term perspective of the foreign policy Turkey, 
the most important characteristics of which are the priority it has always attached 
to relations with the Western world, its pragmatism and its realistic and rational 
assessment of events and developments, proved powerful and prevented a further 
deterioration in Turkish-American relations. As in the post-1964 developments, 
Turkey refrained from taking rash initiatives. Furthermore, relations with the 
Soviets and the Middle East were never seen by the Turkish foreign policy 
establishment as an alternative for Turkey’s ties with the United States, but were 
rather seen as complementary to them.  Plus, Turkey was largely dependent on the 
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United States in a variety of realms and ultimate Soviet goals towards Turkey were 
not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Hence, Turkey never seriously 
contemplated pulling out of NATO or permanently closing down the American 
bases in Turkey and Turkish-American military cooperation continued within the 
larger NATO framework. Turkey refrained from ‘‘overruling collaboration with 
the U.S. and preferred to make its decisions ad hoc’’.388 Plus, ‘‘the fact that the 
catharsis in U.S.-Turkish relations had already been passed in the 1960s’’ coupled 
with the fact that the U.S. executive opposed the embargo ‘‘moderated Turkish 
reactions’’.389 Moreover, Turkey continued its cordial relationship with the U.S. 
executive branch, the State Department and the Pentagon in view of the fact that 
they were trying vigorously to have the embargo lifted and because the ‘‘U.S. 
executive did not mind Turkish purchases of U.S.-origin spare parts from other 
NATO members. In the words of George Harris, ‘‘despite the vicissitudes in the 
collaboration’’, there was present ‘‘a degree of understanding of the extensiveness 
of shared interests in the official level’’.390  
 
4.3.1. Turkish foreign policy towards the Soviet Union 
 Following the imposition of the arms embargo, the improvement in 
Turkish-Soviet relations that had started in the mid-1960s accelerated. In addition 
to the disillusionment with the U.S., the decreasing of the threat that the Soviet 
Union posed to Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s and the detente process were 
important factors in this development. Visits by high level civilian and military 
officials continued; the Soviet Union continued to extend economic assistance and 
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credits on favorable terms for industrial facilities391 and both countries agreed on 
the merits of peaceful co-existence of the two blocs.  
Moreover, during 1974-1979, Turkish-Soviet trade increased three-fold. 
Soviet economic assistance to Turkey in the same timeframe amounted to $650 
million which was ‘‘one third of all Soviet economic assistance for that 
period’’,392  attesting to the desire on the U.S.S.R.’s part to improve relations with 
Turkey. Furthermore, the Soviets continued to extend economic to Turkey to build  
industrial facilities. 
Political relations further improved, too. In June 1978, the two sides signed 
a Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly 
Cooperation, which, though ‘‘going much less far than the fully fledged non-
aggression pact that the Soviets government had been working for’’,393  stipulated 
that the two countries would not allow the use of their territory for aggressive 
purposes or for subversive activities against each other. In July 1976, the Soviet 
aircraft carrier Kiev trespassed the Turkish Straits even though the passage of such 
navy ships is not allowed in the 1936 Montreux Convention. ‘‘The Turkish 
Government accepted the Soviet description of the Kiev as an anti-submarine 
cruiser’’.394 
Nevertheless, cognizant of the Russians’ unending continuing desire to 
control the Straits and their long-term intentions vis-à-vis Turkey, the Turks 
continued to act with a degree of caution in their relations with the Soviet Union 
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and hence refused for example, to purchase Soviet military equipment or to sign a 
non-aggression pact.  
 
4.3.2. Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
In the 1960s, the problems in the relations with the United States and the 
need to garner diplomatic and political support for its Cyprus policy had led 
Turkey to pursue the objectives of separating its foreign policy towards the Middle 
East from its alliance relationship with the United States and improving its 
political relations with the countries of the region, regardless of those countries’ 
regimes. This policy was intensified and in the 1970s, an economic rationale was 
added to the need to further pursue this policy: The oil price hikes of 1973-74 had 
increased Turkey’s need to purchase oil inexpensively. Moreover, it was thought 
that Turkey’s foreign exchange shortage could be solved by convincing the Arabs 
to invest their money in Turkey and by increasing exports to the region.  
Therefore, Turkey continued its earlier policy of refraining from acting as 
an American proxy in Middle East conflicts and began to adopt an even more pro-
Palestinian policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1976, it officially recognized the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and a PLO office was opened in Turkey 
in 1979. In the same year, Turkey allowed the Americans to use the bases in 
Turkey to evacuate the Americans in Iran, but it refused to take part in the U.S. 
embargo on Iran following the hostage crisis, in order not to offend its south-
eastern neighbor. In the economic sphere, Turkey’s trade relations with the region 
increased considerably. 200,000 Turks became employed in Middle Eastern 
countries and many Turkish construction companies signed contracts in the region.  
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As a result of these policies, the memories of the strained relations between the 
Middle Eastern countries and Turkey in the 1950s were forgotten and a relative 
degree of confidence started to characterize Turkish-Arab relations. ‘‘Without 
changing the basic tenets of their foreign policy, Turkish policy makers were able 
to pull the Middle East states to their side to the extent that was possible’’.395  
 
4.4. Turkish-American relations after the embargo and American economic 
assistance to Turkey 
After 1978, Turkey ‘‘entered a phase of re-engagement in the Western 
alliance’’,396 in that the strains in Turkish-U.S. relations receded and Turkish-
American relations improved significantly. ‘‘As in the case of the previous phase’’ 
(1964-1978), ‘’this realignment had both international and domestic political 
causes’’:397 First of all, the repeal of the embargo legislation removed an important 
obstacle before the improvement of Turkish-American relations. Parallel to this 
development, changes in the relations between the super powers at the end of the 
1970s had heightened tensions in international politics. The Americans no longer 
perceived the détente process as beneficial to American national interests, while 
the change in the nuclear balance in the Soviets’ favor increased the value and 
importance of conventional military forces. As a result, the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations were determined to increase American war-making power and 
NATO’s military capability. Moreover, regional developments like the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978-1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, and the 
changing naval and aerial military balance in the eastern Mediterranean in the 
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Soviets’ favor in the 1970s and the resulting American concerns about the security 
of this strategic area accentuated Turkey’s importance to the Western alliance. 
Within this context, the U.S. embarked on a policy to improve economic, political 
and military ties with the Turks.398  On the Turkish side, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan made many realize ‘‘what could happen to a small country on the 
borders of the Soviet Union which opted for neutrality’’.399 The new international 
environment also limited Turkey’s foreign policy choices vis-à-vis the 
superpowers, underscoring the need to constitute a closer alliance relationship with 
the United States. 
Parallel to these international developments, Turkey was witnessing 
rampant political polarization and violence between the left and the right, along 
with an acute economic crisis in the late 1970s. Consequently, the Turkish military 
intervened in politics again on 12 September, 1980. Following the coup, the 
military junta (1980-1982), which was known to be pro-American and staunchly 
anti-communist, promulgated a restrictive constitution and embarked on a 
crackdown on political terrorism. In the United States, the aforementioned 
international developments enhanced the value of Turkey in the eyes of many 
Congressmen. As a result of these domestic and international changes, all aspects 
of Turkish-American relations would start to markedly improve in the 1980s while 
Turkish relations with the Soviets would deteriorate considerably. 
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4.4.1. The 1980 Defense and Cooperation Agreement 
  After the embargo on arms transfers to Turkey was lifted in 1978, 
negotiations for a new defense and cooperation agreement ensued. Affected by the 
economic repercussions of the three year-long sanction, Turkey was insistent on 
including economic aspects in the agreement and wanted to rule out the use of 
NATO bases for non-NATO purposes. Further, ‘‘to limit the ability of the U.S. 
Congress to restrict Turkish access to arms or to impose drastic cuts in aid, Ankara 
wished the accord to commit Washington to multi-year aid packages’’.400  
Moreover, Turkey, intent on establishing a viable domestic arms industry, asked 
for extensive technology transfer from the United States. 
The Turks were successful in having the Americans accept most of its 
above-mentioned demands owing to the rise in the importance and value that the 
United States attached to the Turkish alliance and following 16 months of 
negotiations, the new DCA was signed in 30 March 1980.401 Unlike the previous 
agreements, the 1980 agreement was comprehensive, regulating many aspects of 
the relationship, including an economic component (whereby the United States 
explicitly committed itself to the strengthening of the Turkish economy and 
improving economic and trade relations between the two parties), so the 1980 
agreement was named the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(DECA). The duration of the agreement was to be five years. Unlike the non-
ratified 1976 DCA, the 1980 DECA did not foresee a specific amount of aid to be 
provided to Turkey, but the Americans undertook to provide the necessary military 
equipment to enhance Turkey’s military capacity. The Turks, on the other hand 
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allowed the United States to maintain military personnel and carry out joint 
defense activities in 12 bases and installations (which would be jointly used by the 
Turks and the Americans) including the İncirlik (Adana) air operations and 
support base, the Sinop electromagnetic monitoring base, the Pirinçlik 
(Diyarbakır) radar warning and space monitoring base, the Yamanlar (İzmir), 
Şahintepe (Gemlik), Elmadağ (Ankara), Karataş (Adana), Mahmurdağ (Samsun), 
Alemdağ (İstanbul) and Kürecik (Malatya) nodal communication sites, the Belbaşı 
(Ankara) seismic data collection site and the Kargaburun (İstanbul) radio 
navigation site.402 The loss of intelligence-gathering installations in Iran following 
the Islamic Revolution in that country had increased the importance of especially 
the monitoring bases in Sinop, Pirinçlik (Diyarbakır) and Belbaşı (Ankara). 
Moreover, the Agreement explicitly stipulated that the bases are under Turkish 
control and part of Turkish state property. Thirteen joint military facilities were 
handed over to the Turks. 
The 1980 DECA also specifically and explicitly ruled out out-of-area 
operations in the Middle East using the NATO bases on Turkish soil. It separated 
economic aid from military aid and foresaw American support for the nascent 
Turkish defense industry through the transfer of American technological know-
how and military equipment to Turkey. The most important part of this program 
stipulated the joint-production in Turkey of F-16 aircraft.403  
In concluding, one can state that, all in all, these developments in the 
political and military spheres of the relationship as of the late 1970s were another 
vindication of the widely-shared claims that:  
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        the general American attitude towards Turkey, which was basically  
        security-oriented (which was itself a result of the interaction of détente, 
        U.S. internal politics and threat perceptions) prevented a consistent and 
        steady development of relations404 
 
and that alienation was observed in Turkish-American relations in times of 
détente, whereas  a rapprochement was witnessed when the Cold War intensified. 
 
4.4.2. Economic relations  
 As indicated in Chapter III, American economic aid to Turkey had started 
to dwindle as a result of the change in general U.S. foreign aid policy405 while 
loans started to constitute a bigger portion of U.S. assistance at the expense of the 
obviously more lucrative grant aid. This trend continued in the early 1970s. 
Moreover, ‘‘Western technical assistance for all practical purposes ended in 1975 
with the closing down of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) mission in Ankara406.  
        The 1975-1978 U.S. arms embargo prohibited military aid, but posed 
        no legal barrier to economic assistance. Yet there was none until the 
        economic crisis of the late 1970s, the rise in the strategic importance of 
        Turkey and the lifting of the arms embargo brought a resumption of 
        economic aid in 1979.407  
 
It also seemed that the U.S. used pressure in regard to foreign trade.408 
 
Meanwhile, along with the oil price hikes of 1973-4 and 1978-9 (which 
doubled the amount of Turkey’s imports, leading to a big rise in Turkey’s trade 
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deficit), the economic recession in Europe, wrong economic policies409 and  the 
refusal of the IMF to reschedule Turkey’s debts and extend loans (due to Turkish 
governments’ opposition to adopting austerity measures as part of the stand-by 
agreement), the ‘‘curtailment of U.S. economic assistance’’410 and the ban on U.S. 
military assistance (because limited economic resources had to be diverted to 
purchase military equipment and spare parts resulting in a serious foreign 
exchange crisis) were major causes of the crisis in the Turkish economy. 
Furthermore, according to Criss, ‘‘it is plausible that Turkey’s loss of prestige due 
to the embargo might have rendered loans and credits from Western banks more 
difficult to obtain’’.411 Turkey also ‘‘probably lost some foreign investment as 
well, because of the unsettled atmosphere of the sharp confrontation with the 
United States’’.412 
As the result of the above-mentioned factors, Turkey, in the late 1970s 
found itself in a vicious cycle of rampant inflation, a very high unemployment rate 
and a severe foreign exchange shortage, with foreign debts exceeding $13,5 
billion. In order to solve the crisis, Turkey, in 1978, signed an agreement with the 
IMF for a loan to relieve its foreign exchange crisis, but the second installment of 
the loan was not released by the IMF, for the Ecevit government refused to 
implement all the austerity measures that the Fund asked from Turkey (including a 
major devaluation of the Turkish lira, wage freezes and further cutting of 
government expenditures and subsidies).413 Nevertheless, in January 1979, the 
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U.S. and Germany extended a loan of 380 million German marks to Turkey, 
thereby preventing a financial insolvency in the short-term. Despite this 
emergency aid, the Turkish economic crisis deepened and in November 1979, the 
new Demirel government had to accept the severe IMF austerity measures and 
embarked on a neo-liberal economic stabilization program (in consultation with 
the IMF and international banks), which emphasized a market economy at the 
expense of reducing government intervention in economic life and foresaw an 
export-led development strategy to replace the import substitution method of 
industrialization. The IMF, in exchange, extended new loans and rescheduled 
Turkey’s foreign debts.414 This economic policy was continued during the military 
regime and the following Özal government. As a result of these developments and 
with the resumption of very high levels of U.S. military and economic aid to 
Turkey,415 the Turkish economic situation would significantly improve in the 
1980s.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 The Soviet demands from Turkey towards the end of World War II 
terrified the Turks and prompted a search for security. The United States seemed 
as the only country that was militarily capable of countering the Soviet threat to 
Turkey’s territorial integrity and its independence, so the İnönü government tried 
to involve the United States in the protection of Turkey. However, the Americans 
at that stage were not interested in protecting Turkey, believing that the wartime 
partnership with the Soviet Union could be continued. But by mid-1946, as a result 
of Soviet expansionism, Washington realized that cooperation with the Soviets 
could not be continued and that the world was being split into two rival blocs. 
Hence, the United States had to forego its traditionally isolationist foreign policy 
and embark on a project of containing Soviet expansionism by strengthening 
Western Europe militarily and economically. It had also realized that the Soviet 
extension of control over Turkey would have important ramifications for the 
Western world owing to the important geo-strategic location of Turkey. 
 Accordingly, the United States showed its interest in Turkey’s security by 
sending in 1946 the battleship Missouri to İstanbul, which ended Turkey’s 
diplomatic isolation following World War II, and with the Truman Doctrine of 
1947, which was aimed at strengthening Turkey (and Greece) against communist 
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aggression and, which was a clear sign that the U.S was prepared to make a 
substantial contribution to Turkey’s defense. However, the Doctrine did not 
establish an alliance relationship between the two countries. Thus, the Turks still 
needed to secure a permanent American commitment to Turkey’s defense.  
 Meanwhile, by 1948, a security organization i.e. NATO to strengthen 
Europe’s defensive capability against Soviet expansionism was in the making. The 
first two Turkish applications were unsuccessful because the United States initially 
wanted to use its insufficient defense budget to provide for the protection of the 
more important Western Europe. But the initial American reluctance to extend 
NATO membership to Turkey was overcome by the outbreak of the Korean War 
and the subsequent change in American military strategy, as a result of which, the 
American defense budget increased considerably and Turkey’s geo-strategic value 
vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East was magnified.  
Accordingly, Turkey acceded to NATO in 1952. Turkish diplomacy had 
finally achieved its foremost post-war goal. On the American side, the reason for 
wanting to constitute an alliance partnership with Turkey was almost exclusively 
based on the strategic and military needs. In defending Turkey, the U.S. was acting 
as a nation whose global interests would be endangered if Turkey faltered 
economically, militarily or politically.416 On the Turks’ part, the search for security 
in the face of Soviet threats, the pro-Western tenet of its foreign policy and its 
need for economic aid were the most important factors that prompted it to want to 
accede to NATO and constitute a close alliance relationship with the U.S.  
 During the following phase of Turkish-American relations (1952- early 
1960s), Turkish policy makers enthusiastically followed a foreign policy very 
                                                          
416 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus, p. 372. 
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similar to that of the United States. Turkey pursued a policy of constituting as 
close an alliance relationship with the U.S. as possible in the diplomatic, economic 
and military realms at the expense of even subordinating some of its national 
interests.   
During this era, Turkish-American relations were, in essence, harmonious 
owing to the perception of congruence of Turkish-American interests within the 
context of the main goal of checking Soviet expansionism. The relatively small 
problems and disagreements that arose in the relationship such as the American 
use of Turkish bases in the 1958 Lebanon crisis without notifying the Turks 
beforehand or the economic aid controversy of the 1950s were solved or 
subordinated within the mutual main, long-term goal of containing communism. 
Moreover, the perception of the congruence of Turkish-American interests and 
policies prevented Turkey from putting restrictions on the activity of Americans, 
who started to use the NATO-cum-U.S installations on Turkish soil for purposes 
other than containment of communism. 
 Serious problems would start to appear in the alliance partnership as of the 
early 1960s. Many of these arose as detente seemed to grow in super power 
relations and as the Soviet threat receded to both the United States and Turkey. 
Moreover, strategic and technological developments lessened the value of 
Turkey’s alliance in American eyes, too. But the major catalyst in the deterioration 
of Turkish-American relations was the Cyprus crisis of 1964. Then, President 
Johnson tried to avert Turkish intervention in Cyprus by refusing to extend support 
in case of a Soviet attack on Turkey that would come as the result of a Turkish 
military intervention in Cyprus. The letter and the subsequent troubles constituted 
a major turning point in the history of the relations. The letter led to resentment 
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against and a major Turkish disillusionment with the U.S. It also created doubts in 
Turkish eyes about the automacity and reliability of the Americans’ commitment 
to Turkish security. Together with parallel international and domestic 
developments, the letter prompted a change in the relations. As of that date, the 
close Turkish-American alliance relationship, which had reached its peak in the 
1950s and early 1960s, would begin to cool. Ties would weaken. A widespread 
anti-American sentiment emerged. Turkey embarked on a policy of normalizing its 
relations with the non-Western world and trying to put its relations with the 
Americans on a more equal basis and it tried to reduce its dependency on the 
United States. But cooperation with the Americans was not ruled out and Turkey 
did not contemplate pulling out of NATO at the policy making level, for Turkey 
was dependent on the United States in a variety of realms, be it economic, military 
or political. On the Americans’ part, too despite the changing international 
circumstances, there weren’t any second thoughts regarding the usefulness of the 
Turkey’s alliance. 
 Another turning point that led to deterioration in relations came with the 
Cyprus crisis of 1974 when Turkey carried out two military operations in Cyprus 
to protect its kin on the island, prompting the U.S. Congress to impose an arms 
embargo on Turkey in early 1975. In response, Ankara suspended the activities of 
American bases on its soil and abrogated the 1969 Defense and Cooperation 
Agreement. The embargo led to further questioning of the reliability of the United 
States and underlined the need to lessen Turkish dependency on the United States. 
Along with parallel international and domestic developments in both countries, the 
embargo prompted Turkey to intensify its 1960s policy of improving relations 
with the Soviet Union and with Middle Eastern countries and put its relations with 
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the United States on a more equal footing. The alliance relationship loosened. The 
parties, especially the Turks, no longer believed that the foreign policy goals of the 
two countries were identical on almost every issue.  
 But nevertheless, as in the aftermath of the Johnson letter, the alliance 
relations continued (though the degree of cooperation decreased considerably). 
For, it still had a considerable military value in the eyes of both parties and Turkey 
was so much dependent on the West in general and the U.S. in particular that, a 
shift to neutrality in its foreign relations seemed unfeasible. Further, the fact that 
the U.S. executive branch vehemently opposed the embargo also softened Turkish 
reaction and prevented a further disengagement in relations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
THE EMBARGOED MILITARY ITEMS 
 
 
As mentioned in the thesis, the American arms embargo on Turkey 
encompassed all American-made or American-licensed military equipment, 
systems and their spare parts. 
 
The Land Forces 
1. Tanks, anti-tank cannons and similar systems and their ammunition and spare 
parts. 
2. Surface to surface tactical missiles and rockets and their spare parts. 
3. Military engineering, communication (signals), loading systems and 
equipments. 
4. Communication systems.  
5. Anti-aircraft systems. 
6. Infantry arms. 
7. Maintenance and repair systems of the above-mentioned military equipments 
and systems. 
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8. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned 
military equipments and systems. 
9. Measurement and calibration devices for the above-mentioned arms systems. 
 
The Navy 
 
1. Surface vessels and submarines and their ammunition and spare parts.  
2. Anti-aircraft systems. 
3. Systems facilitating loading and unloading in ports. 
4. Navy aircrafts. 
5. Electronic systems, maintenance and repair systems and measurement and 
calibration devices. 
6. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned 
military equipments and systems. 
7. Communications (signals), radar and monitoring systems. 
 
The Air Force 
 
1. Aircrafts and their guided bullet, rocket and machine gun systems. 
2. Helicopters. 
3. Surface to air missile systems and their radars. 
4. Anti-aircraft cannons and radars. 
5. Communication (signals) systems. 
6. Radar systems. 
7. Air base storage, loading and unloading systems, devices and facilities. 
8. Military engineering devices. 
9. The maintenance and repair systems of the above-mentioned military 
equipments and systems. 
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10. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned 
military equipments and systems. 
11. Measurement and calibration equipment of the above-mentioned military 
equipments and systems. 
 
Source: Interview with retired Staff Colonel İsmail Pakel. November 22, 2006. 
Ankara, Turkey. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
THE EMBARGO LEGISLATION: SECTION 620(x) OF THE 
1961 U.S. 
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT 
 
 
 
 
All military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether 
for cash or by credit, guarantee, or any other means), and all licenses with respect 
to the transportation of arms, ammunitions and implements of war (including 
technical data relating thereto) to the Government of Turkey, shall be suspended 
on the date of enactment of this subsection unless and until the President 
determines and certifies to to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in 
compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales 
Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress 
towards agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: Provided 
That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and such 
acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful 
solution of the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only until 
February 5, 1975, and only if, during that time, Turkey shall observe the ceasefire 
and shall neither increase the forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any U.S. 
supplied implements of war. 
Source: Fahir Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Turkish-
American relations: A Documentary Record), Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1991, p. 286. 
